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In the past, federal law has been relatively clear that an adminis-
trative body vested with authority to issue rules and to adjudicate indi-
vidual cases may develop its law through either means, so long as Con-
gress has not specified otherwise and the agency does not abuse its 
discretion. 1 This means that federal law has not generally required 
agencies, as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable, to elaborate 
agency law by rule in rulemaking proceedings. Most states have fol-
lowed federal law in this regard. However, the courts of a number of 
states and recent model state legislation are moving in a different direc-
tion. They appear to be in the process of establishing a mandatory gen-
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1. See infra Section II. 
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era! preference for the elaboration of state agency law by rule rather 
than by ad hoc order. 2 
This article will explore the growing movement to impose a le-
gally binding preference for rulemaking as the primary means of state 
agency lawmaking. The present effort will begin with a description of 
the widely established view that absent specific legislation to the con-
trary, agencies vested with authority to issue rules and to decide indi-
vidual cases have broad discretion to choose the procedural 
means-rulemaking or adjudication-by which they make their law. 
That will be followed by an analysis of the reasons why and the extent 
to which a preference for state agency lawmaking by rule is desirable, 
and the reasons why such a preference for this particular means of 
agency lawmaking is especially justifiable in state government as com-
pared to the federal government. An examination of the decisions of 
several state courts will then reveal the basis and scope of a judicially 
mandated preference for state agency lawmaking by rule in the absence 
of statutes explicitly requiring that result. Finally, legislative proposals 
calculated to impose on state agencies a general duty to elaborate their 
law primarily through rulemaking will be examined in light of objec-
tions to such a statutory innovation. 
This article concludes that a binding general preference for state 
agency lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order is both desirable 
and feasible, so long as that general preference is subject to a rule of 
reason. It also concludes that general statutory provisions on this sub-
ject should be adopted by the several states and that, in the absence of 
such provisions, state courts would be fully justified in imposing on 
agencies in specified circumstances a binding general preference for ad-
ministrative lawmaking by rule. 
II. STATE AGENCY DISCRETION To DETERMINE ITs LAwMAKING 
MoDALITY: THE DoMINANT VIEW 
State legislatures ordinarily delegate express or implied authority 
to their agencies to issue rules after rulemaking proceedings and to is-
sue orders after adjudicatory proceedings. As a result, legislative delega-
tions enable agencies to elaborate agency law in a form - rules -that 
resembles statutes, and also in a form - orders - that resembles the 
case-by-case, common-law precedents of courts. That is, administrative 
agencies are typically authorized to make their law by directly binding 
prescriptive statements of general applicability in rulemaking and by 
individual decisions of particular applicability in adjudication which 
2. See infra Sections IV and V. 
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serve as precedent for future cases. Since agencies are usually author-
ized to use these two different procedural modalities as means by which 
to elaborate their law, they must inevitably choose, in particular situa-
tions, to do so by rule, by ad hoc order, or by both. The scope of their 
discretion to utilize, for this purpose, one modality rather than the 
other, therefore, becomes significant. 
To understand the dominant state view concerning agency discre-
tion to choose the means by which it makes law one must first under-
stand federal law on this subject. The reason for this is that most states 
have uncritically adopted for their own use in this area analogous fed-
eral law, usually citing one or more of three principal United States 
Supreme Court cases on this subject as precedents for their action. As a 
result, a brief description of these federal cases follows. 
The first, and probably most widely cited federal case dealing with 
the freedom of agencies to choose the means by which they make their 
law is SEC v. Chenery Corp. 3 This case involved an SEC decision 
holding that certain corporate insiders could not profit from trading in 
the stock of their corporation while it was in the process of reorganiza-
tion. The agency based its determination on the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act. The insiders insisted that if the SEC desired to prohibit 
such conduct it could do so only by issuing a rule that was prospective 
in nature and that prohibited insider profiteering of the specific type in 
question. 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, refusing "to say that 
the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the 
problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden 
from utilizing this particular [adjudicatory] proceeding for announcing 
and applying a new standard of conduct."4 Indeed, the Court stressed 
that there was a clear place for agency lawmaking on a case-by-case 
basis, and that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or 
by individual ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed 
discretion of the administrative agency."11 The Court explained the rea-
sons for its decision in this way: 
To hold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceed-
ing but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any 
general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this nature, 
would be to stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do. 
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to 
make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making 
3. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
4. Id. at 203. 
5. Id. 
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powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formu-
late new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding 
Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act 
should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legisla-
tive promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid 
requirement to that effect would make the administrative process in-
flexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized 
problems which arise .... Not every principle essential to the effective 
administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the 
mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own devel-
opment, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforesee-
able situations. In performing its important functions in these re-
spects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act 
either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form 
of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.6 
In the second principal case on this subject, the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with a challenge to the validity of an NLRB 
order requiring an employer to furnish a union, prior to a collective 
bargaining election, a list of the names and addresses of its employees. 
The order was based on an earlier NLRB decision requiring employers 
to provide such lists; but the earlier agency decision was prospective 
only, because it did not apply the requirement to the parties in that 
particular case. 7 In a subsequent case involving the Wyman-Gordon 
Co., the NLRB applied the prospective requirement first announced in 
its earlier decision in a way that invalidated a bargaining election be-
cause of the employer's failure to provide such a list of employees to the 
union. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 8 required the Supreme Court to 
decide whether Wyman- Gordon Co. was correct in asserting that the 
NLRB action was invalid because the agency had originally used adju-
dication rather than rulemaking to adopt the requirement that an em-
ployer must furnish a list of employees to unions in these 
circumstances. 
While a majority of the Court upheld the action of the NLRB in 
Wyman-Gordon, it split two ways on the justification for that result. In 
an opinion for four members of the Court, Justice Fortas concluded 
that the wholly prospective nature of the employee list requirement an-
nounced by the NLRB in its earlier case made the requirement a rule; 
and because that rule had not been issued by the use of rulemaking 
proceedings, it was invalid. But Justice Fortas refused to overturn the 
Board's action in Wyman-Gordon, apparently because he believed that 
6. /d. at 202. 
7. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 1966-156 NLRB Dec. (CCH) '11 20,180. 
8. 394 U.S. 7 59 (1969). 
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in this particular case the Board had adjudicated anew the requirement 
announced in its earlier case. As a result, the NLRB could properly 
apply that requirement to Wyman-Gordon Co. in this case.9 Justice 
Black, writing for three members of the Court, also upheld the order of 
the Board in Wyman-Gordon; but he did so on the ground that the 
choice between proceeding by rule or by ad hoc order on a case-by-case 
basis was one that was committed to agency discretion. 10 
The Fortas plurality opinion and the two dissents in Wyman-
Gordon agreed that the wholly prospective nature of the employee list 
requirement announced in the earlier NLRB case demonstrated that 
the requirement should have been issued by the use of rulemaking pro-
cedures rather than in the course of an individual adjudication. 11 How-
ever, these opinions did not appear to challenge the basic Chenery prin-
ciple that the choice of proceeding by rulemaking or adjudication to 
elaborate agency law is up to the agency. Instead, they only appear to 
insist that if agencies desire to issue rules (statements of general appli-
cability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or prescribing 
law) they must follow rulemaking procedures; and if they desire to is-
sue orders (statements of particular applicability declaring individual 
rights based on past facts) they must follow adjudicatory procedures. 
The third principal decision of the United States Supreme Court 
on the subject of agency freedom to choose the means by which it en-
gages in lawmaking is NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 12 In that case the 
Supreme Court addressed the authority of the NLRB to determine 
whether buyers were managerial employees exempted from the re-
quirements of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court of Appeals 
had concluded that the Board could proceed only by rulemaking in 
making that determination. 18 On review, the Supreme Court deter-
mined otherwise and indicated that the agency was free, on remand, to 
proceed either by rulemaking or by adjudication to determine whether 
9. ld. at 766. 
10. Jd. at 772. 
II. Jd. at 765-66 (plurality opinion), 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 780 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
12. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Another United States Supreme Court case that may be relevent to 
this question is Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), decided several months before Bell Aero-
space. The Ruiz opinion stated that the agency involved was required to issue rules, and was 
prohibited from engaging in wholly ad hoc lawmaking, with respect to the criteria applicable to 
the grant or denial of the particular government benefits at issue in that case. This conclusion 
seems to rest upon the provisions of the agency's own adopted procedures and the "abuse of discre-
tion" prohibition contained in the Federal APA. ld. at 231-35. See infra Section IV D. However, 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court before and after Ruiz do not require federal agen-
cies, generally, to prefer lawmaking by rule over lawmaking by ad hoc order. Some lower federal 
courts disagree, at least in certain contexts. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51. 
13. 416 U.S. at 273. 
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the buyers in that or other situations were managerial employees ex-
empt from the National Labor Relations Act. In doing so, the Court 
stressed that 
[t]he views expressed in Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon make plain 
that the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an 
adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and 
adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion. 
Although there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adju-
dication would amount to an abuse of discretion. . . , nothing in the 
present case would justify such a conclusion .... The Board's judg-
ment that adjudication best serves ... [its] purpose is entitled to great 
weight. 14 
These three United States Supreme Court cases demonstrate that 
federal agencies vested with both rulemaking and adjudicatory powers 
may, except to the extent a statute provides otherwise, develop their 
law either by rule or by order on a case-by-case basis, or by both 
means; that their discretion as to the means by which they make their 
law on a given subject is broad and will not be disturbed unless it is 
abused; that there is a strong presumption in favor of the agency's 
choice of lawmaking modality so that a person challenging its propriety 
in a given situation has the burden of persuading a court that the 
agency decision was an abuse of discretion; that the Supreme Court has 
not clearly defined the unusual circumstances in which an agency deci-
sion to elaborate its law by adjudication rather than by rulemaking 
would be improper; and that if an agency decides to issue a rule-a 
statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, inter-
preting, or prescribing law-it must follow applicable rulemaking pro-
cedures and cannot do so in an adjudication. As reflected in these deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, federal law does not create 
any general preference for agency lawmaking by rule. Instead, it leaves 
agencies relatively free to determine, in their own discretion, whether 
they will elaborate their law on a particular subject primarily by 
rulemaking or by adjudication. 
Most states have uncritically followed federal law in this regard. 
Numerous state court opinions declare that state agencies vested with 
authority to issue rules and to engage in adjudication have almost un-
fettered discretion to choose the means by which they elaborate their 
law. A study of the many state court opinions adopting this view sug-
gests that it is based almost entirely on the belief that federal law has 
settled this matter for the states, rather than on an analysis of the state 
14. /d. at 294. 
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administrative process problem at which this law is directed and a con-
clusion that the merits of current federal law make its adoption in the 
state context desirable. However, individual states are free to make 
their own choice on this subject, except to the extent that the federal 
constitution requires otherwise. And the federal constitution does not 
prohibit a state from generally requiring its agencies to prefer rulemak-
ing over adjudication as a means of lawmaking, so long as that require-
ment is qualified by a rule of reason. 
The typical state court opinion on this subject asserts that where 
an administrative agency is authorized to develop its law by rulemaking 
or by adjudication, the agency has broad discretion, in the absence of a 
specific statute to the contrary, to select which of these procedures it 
will employ to make law on a particular subject. 111 State court opinions 
announcing this conclusion often cite Chenery and sometimes Wyman-
Gordon and/ or Bell Aerospace to support that proposition.16 Potential 
differences between state and federal agencies or the contexts in which 
they operate that might be relevant to the wisdom of applying that fed-
eral law principle to the state administrative process are not discussed. 
Furthermore, none of these state cases suggest that state agencies must 
use rulemaking rather than adjudication as their principal means of 
lawmaking, or even that they must do so to the extent practicable and 
feasible. Indeed, as a group, they appear to support the proposition that 
state agencies delegated the authority to issue rules and to decide indi-
vidual cases are usually free to elaborate their law primarily if not ex-
clusively by ad hoc adjudication. 
15. Potts v. Bennett, 487 So. 2d 919, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Amerada Hess Pipeline 
Corp., v. Alaska Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 711 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Alaska 1986); ALRB v. California 
Coastal Farms, Inc., 31 Cal. 3d 469, 473, 645 P.2d 739, 743, 183 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1982); 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981); Young Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa, 276 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Iowa 1979); Consumer 
Protection Div. Office of the Attorney Gen. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 304 Md. 731, 753-54, 
501 A.2d 48, 60 (1985); Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of Dept. of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 
387 Mass. 372, 379, 439 N .E.2d 792, 799 (1982); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Uti!., 383 Mass. 675, 679,421 N.E.2d 449,451 (1981); AFSCME Council25 v. Wayne County, 
152 Mich. App. 87, 98 393 N.W.2d 889, 894 (1986); American Way Life Ins. Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Ins., 131 Mich. App. 1, 2, 345 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Mich. App. 1983); Bunge Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Minn. 1981); Occidental Chern. v. New York 
State Envtl. Facilities, 125 Misc. 2d 1046, 1050, 480 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); 
Dressler Coal Corp. v. Call, 4 Ohio App. 3d 81, 84, 446 N.E.2d 785, 789 (1981); Mollinedo v. 
Texas Employment Comm'n, 662 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); State Bd. of Ins. v. 
Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). 
16. See cases cited supra note 15. 
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III. REASONS STATE AGENCIES SHOULD PREFER LAWMAKING BY 
RULE 
To understand the reasons why a general preference for state 
agency lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc adjudication is desira-
ble one must first appreciate the practical differences between law em-
bodied in rules and law embodied in orders. A rule is an agency state-
ment of general applicability and future effect that implements, 
interprets, or prescribes law or policy or the organization, procedures, 
or practice requirements of an agency. It includes a statement that 
amends, repeals, or suspends another rule. As a result, rules create 
binding law in the form of statements directly applicable to all those to 
whom they are addressed. Agencies are also bound by their own rules. 
However, for good cause a rule may, under some circumstances, and 
within specific limitations, be waived by the issuing agency; but if not, 
a rule directly binds all those within its terms, whether or not they 
participated in the rulemaking proceeding from whence the rule 
originated. 17 
On the other hand, an order is an agency statement of particular 
applicability determining the rights of specific parties on the basis of 
their special circumstances. So orders only result in the ad hoc adoption 
of principles of law that are necessary to solve the particular cases in 
which those principles are announced. Nevertheless, they may serve as 
precedent in similar future cases. An order is not binding directly on 
any persons other than the parties to that particular case. Therefore, 
persons other than the specific parties to that case have the right to 
argue that the precedent should not be followed in their case, and that 
the agency should consider de novo whether the principle on which the 
precedent rests should apply in their case.18 In reality, however, princi-
ples of law declared in particular cases tend to have the same effect as 
rules. The reason for this is that once an agency adjudicates a principle 
of law as part of the resolution of a specific case, the agency tends to 
follow that principle uncritically in all similar future cases, without any 
serious reexamination. To that extent, the practical effect of agency law 
issued in an order does not differ from agency law issued in a rule. 
The typical state administrative procedure act contains two sepa-
17. See generally A. BoNFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 3.3 (1986); I C. 
KoCH, jR. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 2.3 (1985); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW § 4.1-2 (2d ed. 1984). 
18. See sources cited supra note 17. See also Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The 
Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 177, 178 (1986); Young 
Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Iowa 
1979). 
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rate sets of procedures-one for rulemaking and one for adjudication.19 
While agencies delegated authority to issue rules and to decide individ-
ual cases normally have broad discretion as to the means by which they 
may make particular law, they are bound by their state act to follow 
scrupulously the procedures appurtenant to whatever means of law-
making they actually choose in a particular instance. So, "either means 
[of agency lawmaking] may be used so long as the [appropriate] statu-
tory procedure is complied with."20 As a result, "[i]f an agency relies 
upon a rule ... to support its action, the rule must have been promul-
gated in accord with the [rulemaking] procedure in effect at that 
time."21 An agency may not issue a rule in an adjudication.22 Similarly, 
an agency may not decide a particular case through the use of rulemak-
ing procedures; it must use applicable adjudication procedures to issue 
such an individual decision with precedential value. 
There are, however, a number of significant advantages of 
rulemaking as compared to adjudication that suggest the former should 
generally be preferred over the latter for state agency lawmaking.23 
Some of the advantages of rulemaking are a product of the particular 
procedures used in the adoption of rules and some are a product of the 
nature of rules without regard to the procedures employed in their 
adoption. 24 Consider, first, the extent to which all persons who may be 
affected by agency lawmaking have an opportunity to participate in an 
adjudication as compared to a rulemaking. Normally, only those per-
sons who are actually parties to a particular dispute giving rise to an 
adjudication are notified of, or have a right to participate in, that pro-
ceeding.211 This means that other persons who may subsequently be af-
fected by the precedential value of an adjudicative decision of an agency 
do not usually have an effective opportunity to participate in its formu-
lation. It also means that members of the general public do not have an 
effective opportunity to influence law made on a case-by-case, prece-
dential basis. Liberal rights to intervene and to file amicus briefs in 
adjudications are not substitutes for an opportunity to participate in 
rulemaking proceedings on the same subjects. After all, most people 
19. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1961) § 3-4 and 9-14, 14 
U.L.A. 371 (1980) [hereinafter 1961 MSAPA]. The acts of most states are based on the 1961 
MSAPA. 
20. 276 N.W.2d at 382. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 382-83. 
23. For a brief summary statement of many of the following advantages of rulemaking over 
adjudication see Berg, supra note 18, at 163-64. 
24. See Berg, supra note 18, at 164. 
25. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, §§ 9(a), 1(5). 
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affected by ad hoc agency lawmaking on a precedential basis will not 
even know about the existence of current agency adjudications of im-
portance to them. Even if they did, it is unlikely that all of them could 
or would be allowed an effective opportunity to participate in such 
adjudications. 
In rulemaking, however, the situation is quite different. The typi-
cal state administrative procedure act requires agencies to give advance 
notice of proposed rules to the general public and to give an opportu-
nity for all interested members of the general public to comment on 
those proposals prior to their adoption. 26 This means that persons who 
are not parties to an adjudication declaring new law have a better op-
portunity to protect their interests if the law in question is made by 
rulemaking rather than by adjudication. It also means that the public-
at-large has a better opportunity to influence law made by rule than by 
order because rulemaking procedure gives members of the general pub-
lic a more effective opportunity to mobilize political pressures for and 
against a proposed agency policy than does adjudication procedure. 
Agencies making policy by rule are also likely to have access to a 
broader base of relevent information if they make their law by rule 
rather than by order because a wider class of affected persons and the 
general public will have an opportunity to submit information to the 
agency about the desirability of that law before it becomes final. 
Rulemaking is also better than adjudication if one wishes to ensure 
that an administrative lawmaking product is consistent with the popu-
lar will. The trial-type procedures typically used in the agency adjudi-
cative process, including bans on ex parte communications and exclu-
sivity of the record requirements, tend to protect agencies seeking to 
implement their own policy preferences in the course of such an adjudi-
cative process against intervention in that process by outside political 
pressures. On the other hand, the notice and comment procedures typi-
cally used in the state agency rulemaking process permit and facilitate 
intervention in that process by members of the general public in a way 
that allows them to frustrate, through the use of external political pres-
sures, agency policy preferences that are inconsistent with the will of 
the community-at-large as reflected in the balance of power in current 
interest group politics. 
This, then, is another reason why state agencies should generally 
be required to employ rulemaking rather than adjudication for their 
lawmaking. Agency lawmaking cannot be deemed legitimate unless its 
product is consistent with the will of the community-at-large as ex-
26. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 3(a). 
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pressed by its popularly elected legislature. This is so because, in our 
society, sovereignty ultimately resides in the body politic and not in its 
many unelected administrative agents. Of course, there are two ways to 
ensure that agency lawmaking is consistent with the popular will. 
First, the delegation ... [to agencies of lawmaking] authority may be 
made with such precise instructions concerning the end to be achieved 
that logic and technological competence ... will dictate a relatively 
narrow range of results. Or, second, the manner of exercising an im-
precise delegation may be designed to reflect the same forces that 
work upon the [popularly elected] legislature itself, and thus to pro-
duce approximately the same results. 27 
The first means of ensuring the accountability of agency lawmak-
ing has generally failed because modern legislative delegations to agen-
cies of lawmaking authority tend to be very imprecise and vague. How-
ever, the second means of ensuring the accountability of agency 
lawmaking has succeeded. But its success has required a highly politi-
cal scheme of everyday agency lawmaking in order to ensure that the 
product of that process conducted under broad and vague delegations is 
consistent with the wishes of the legislature. 28 Since the rulemaking 
process permits and facilitates efforts by interested members of the gen-
eral public to block, through the use of political pressures, implementa-
tion of the policy preferences of our administrative agents that are in-
consistent with the balance of political power in the community, and 
the adjudication process does not, rulemaking is generally a more desir-
able agency lawmaking process than adjudication. 
Agency law made by rule is generally better than agency law 
made by ad hoc order for another reason. Agency rules are almost al-
ways more highly visible than agency case law to members of the pub-
lic. The reason for this is that members of the public can more easily 
ascertain the existence and specific contents of agency law that is em-
bodied in rules than agency law embodied in adjudicatory decisions. 
The compilation of state administrative rules is published and is availa-
ble in public libraries and law libraries in all communities in the state. 
State agency case law, however, is almost never published and is usu-
ally available only in the files of the agency. Even the legal right to 
copy those decisions contained in agency files cannot overcome this dif-
ference, and the practical problems it causes for regulated persons seek-
ing to ascertain the precise contents of the law to which they must con-
form. It should be noted that federal agency case law is much more 
27. Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: The judicialization of Standardless Rulemaking, 
REG., July-Aug. 1977 at 38, 40. 
28. See id. 
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frequently published and, therefore, much more easily available than 
state agency case law which is almost never published. Consequently, 
on this basis the argument for requiring agencies to make their law by 
rule is more compelling for state agencies than for federal agencies. 
The fact that the unpublished case law of state agencies is much 
less visible and accessible than their widely disseminated published 
rules also means that the governor and legislature may not effectively 
monitor law made by agencies in the course of adjudications. Further-
more, neither the governor nor the legislature may use the special pow-
ers they have in many states to review effectively agency lawmaking 
when it is executed wholly on a case-by-case basis. The reason for this 
is that state administrative procedure acts vest them with such special 
review powers only with respect to agency rules.29 No acceptable 
scheme has yet been devised for the systematic and effective review by 
the governor and legislature of agency law created on a case-by-case 
basis in adjudications. 
To make state schemes for the review of agency rulemaking fully 
effective, state agencies must be precluded from making their most con-
troversial policies by ad hoc order. Otherwise, state agencies could by-
pass completely these formidable executive and legislative review mech-
anisms calculated to check agency lawmaking that is inconsistent with 
the political will of the community-at-large. It should be noted that 
state administrative procedure acts contain much more formidable 
schemes of executive and legislative review of agency rules than cur-
rently exist in federal law.30 As a result, there is a greater need on this 
basis to impose a preference for lawmaking by rule on state agencies 
than on federal agencies. If Congress decides to create a more effective 
scheme for executive and legislative review of federal agency rulemak-
ing, it would probably increase the restrictions on the freedom of fed-
eral agencies to make law on an ad hoc precedential basis in individual 
cases. Otherwise such a scheme would not accomplish its objectives. 
Agency lawmaking by rule is generally better than agency law-
making by order for another reason. It is likely to be easier for mem-
bers of the general public to discern current agency law from rules than 
from adjudications because decisional law is normally more difficult for 
laymen to understand. Interpretation of decisional law depends on the 
particular facts involved in the cases in which that law originated. 
Rules, on the other hand, are not dependent on the particular facts 
from which they first emerged. The product of adjudication is also in-
29. See Bonfield State Law In The Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of 
The Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REv. 95, 110-23 (1982). 
30. Id. 
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ferior to the product of rulemaking insofar as it serves as a guide to the 
agency staff and the regulated public. Unless an adjudicatory decision is 
distorted with dictum relating to situations not involved in that particu-
lar case, both the agency staff and the regulated public must resort to 
reading a line of cases and formulating from them a statement of the 
principles followed by the agency with respect to a more general mat-
ter. This is not only time consuming and expensive because of its de-
pendence upon specialized talents cultivated primarily by lawyers, but 
also because it tends to induce unnecessary error and conflict because of 
inevitable misreadings. 31 
Another advantage of rulemaking over adjudication as a means of 
agency lawmaking relates to efficiency. After all, a rule is a statement 
of general applicability while an order is only a statement of particular 
applicability. As a result, lawmaking by adjudication is likely to re-
quire litigation before the agency in a multiplicity of cases, whereas a 
single rulemaking may settle the policy questions involved in many 
cases without need for future litigation before the agency to resolve 
them. 32 That is, a single rule can eliminate issues of law in many cases, 
leaving only issues of disputed facts, thereby eliminating the necessity 
for repetitive arguments in multiple adjudications on the many policy 
issues that may be settled by a single rule. 33 Lawmaking by rule is also 
more efficient than lawmaking by order because it allows agencies to 
focus upon a few proceedings raising comparatively few major policy 
issues. When agencies make law by adjudication, however, they must 
often spread their attention thinly over a large number of cases that 
raise an even larger number of minor policy issues as well as major 
policy issues. 34 
Rulemaking is also generally superior to adjudication for agency 
lawmaking because rulemaking requires the agency to focus on the is-
sues of law that must be decided, without being diverted, as it is in 
adjudication, by the more specific and parochial concerns of particular 
parties who wish to have their dispute resolved. 35 Of course, it may also 
31. See Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy 
Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254, 272 (1968). 
32. See Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach - Which Should It Be? 22 LAw & 
CoNTt:MP. PROBS. 658, 664 (1957). 
33. See Note, The Use of Agency Rulemaking to Deny Adjudications Apparently Required 
by Statute, 54 IowA L. REV. 1086, 1100-1101 (1969). 
34. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 590-92 (1970) ("The principal advantage of rule 
making is that it provides clear articulation of broad agency policy. By contrast, the entire array of 
[an agency's] adjudicatory decisions on a subject often gives a diffuse, overly subtle mosaic of 
current [agency] doctrine."). 
35. See Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Rt:v. 
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be argued that lawmaking by rule is undesirable because it requires 
agencies to make decisions in the abstract, without the benefit of an 
actual case to test their wisdom or to help clarify the issues involved. 
However, the fact that rulemaking requires an agency to make deci-
sions in the abstract is a factor that an agency can and should consider 
in determining whether, in a particular situation, rulemaking is infeasi-
ble or impracticable. But the fear of abstract decisionmaking is not a 
sound argument for resisting the imposition on agencies of a general 
duty to prefer rulemaking in situations where it is feasible and 
practicable. 
Note also that agency lawmaking by rule rather than by order is 
preferable because it enables the parties and decision makers in adjudi-
cations to ascertain and focus more clearly on the precise facts that 
must be demonstrated in such cases.36 In adjudications, where agencies 
make the applicable law and also determine if it has been violated, the 
parties and decisionmakers often confuse the necessary facts and burden 
of persuasion associated with the law-applying function, with the nec-
essary facts and burden of persuasion associated with the lawmaking 
function. Furthermore, an important or novel question of law may arise 
in an adjudication that is not necessary to a decision in that particular 
case. However, attempts to resolve it in that context could result in a 
deemphasis of the actual controversy involved, an unconscionable delay 
to its conclusion, a distortion of the question of law involved, and an 
inadequately informed and dispassionate consideration of its merits. 
Nevertheless, when agencies rely heavily on case-by-case decisions to 
make their law, attempts at resolving issues of law in adjudications that 
do not squarely present them are inevitable because more suitable cases 
for resolving those issues may be unavailable.37 
Lawmaking by rule is also generally more desirable than lawmak-
ing by order because the former allows an agency to initiate, on its 
own, changes in or elaborations of its law. On the other hand, lawmak-
ing by order leaves the initiative for such changes or elaborations to 
private parties who start litigation or engage in action prompting 
agency enforcement proceedings. 38 In other words, an agency need not 
await the occurrence of a set of facts involving a particular individual to 
make law embodied in a rule. The agency may make that law when-
ever it desires, prior to any violations, and as a means of avoiding the 
781, 788-90 (1965). 
36. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on State Administra-
tive Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REv. 411, 442 (1980). 
37. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication In the Development of Admin-
istrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 937-40 (1965). 
38. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 590-92. 
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occurrence of such circumstances in the first place. So, rulemaking, un-
like adjudication, allows an agency to create its own lawmaking time 
table and to implement its own system of lawmaking priorities. 
In addition, rulemaking is a superior means of lawmaking with 
respect to matters directly affecting a significant number of persons 
who are not likely to be represented by lawyers. This is so because 
informal notice and comment rulemaking procedures are generally 
more accessible to persons who do not have the assistance of counsel 
and are easier for them to use, than are formal, trial-type, adjudicative 
procedures. Adjudicative procedures almost always require the assis-
tance of counsel because of their complexity and reliance upon skills 
specially possessed by lawyers. Since state agencies ordinarily make law 
directly affecting substantial numbers of persons who are not repre-
sented by counsel either because they are too poor to afford such repre-
sentation or because the matters involved have relatively small financial 
value,39 those agencies should be required to make their law primarily 
by rule rather than by order. This argument for a rulemaking prefer-
ence is less persuasive with respect to federal agencies. Persons involved 
in the federal administrative process are, in general, more likely to be 
represented by lawyers than those involved in the similar state 
processes. This is so because the matters dealt with by federal agencies 
tend to have larger financial value than the matters dealt with by state 
agencies, and organizations representing the poor appear to be more 
available to protect the interests of such persons in the federal adminis-
trative process than in the similar processes of the several states. 
Another reason why state agencies should prefer rulemaking over 
adjudication for their lawmaking is that rules are normally prospec-
tive-they indicate the law that the agency will rely upon in the future. 
Adjudication, on the other hand, has the disadvantage of being inher-
ently retrospective, declaring rights based on past acts. As a result, law-
making by rule gives affected persons fair notice of agency law, permit-
ting them to conduct their affairs accordingly, while lawmaking by 
adjudication does not. One of the most serious adverse affects of using 
the adjudication process for agency lawmaking, therefore, is the retro-
active effect upon parties who legitimately relied upon prior law, or 
had no advance notice of the new law suddenly declared by the agency 
as a basis for its decision in their cases. Of course, courts make retroac-
tive policy changes in the course of adjudications, "but courts have no 
substantive rulemaking powers."40 The same is not true of most admin-
istrative agencies. Typically, administrative agencies have authority to 
39. See Bonfield, supra note 29, at 127. 
40. See Peck, supra note 31, at 273. 
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make their law either by rule or by order. To avoid retroactive law-
making, agencies should make as much of their law as is possible by 
rule rather than by order. It may be argued that an increase in 
rulemaking as a means of elaborating agency policy at the expense of 
ad hoc lawmaking is undesirable because the prospective nature of 
rulemaking may encourage agencies to interpret applicable statutes 
more expansively than they might in adjudications whose product 
would be retrospective. The answer to that fear, of course, is that judi-
cial review and legislative action is always available to check any un-
warranted agency interpretations of applicable statutes in rulemaking. 
Primary reliance on rulemaking for agency lawmaking is also de-
sirable because it is more likely to assure uniform treatment of simi-
larly situated persons than is the use of adjudication for that purpose. 
All persons subject to a rule are affected at the same time and in the 
same way. 41 Agency lawmaking by adjudication, however, increases the 
likelihood that agencies will draw irrelevant distinctions between sub-
stantially similar cases and allows agencies to disregard applicable 
precedents in some cases on the grounds they are not technically bind-
ing on other persons. Therefore, adjudication is not an especially ap-
propriate means for the formulation of legal principles that are in fact 
applicable to a broad class of persons because it permits low visibility, 
differential agency decisionmaking of an arbitrary or capricious nature. 
Lawmaking by rule might be deemed inferior to lawmaking by 
order precisely because rules are statements of general applicability 
rather than of particular applicability and, therefore, mandate uniform 
treatment for all those subject to their provisions. The argument is that 
agencies should not be bound to apply agency law to all cases within its 
ambit. Universal application of agency law necessarily results in unrea-
sonable consequences. Agencies must, therefore, be free to elaborate and 
apply agency law in an ad hoc manner. This, of course, can be accom-
plished more easily when agency law is made in adjudications. The ad 
hoc elaboration and application of agency law might also be deemed to 
result in fairer regulation because the contents of the law and the appli-
cation of the law can be carefully tailored to the facts of each case, 
thereby avoiding the overgeneralizations inherent in rulemaking which 
necessarily results in a product that is of general applicability.'2 
This argument is unpersuasive. Agencies have always had some 
prosecutorial discretion in the application of their rules. As a result, 
agencies may refuse to apply a rule to inappropriate circumstances oth-
41. See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 178-80 (1965). 
42. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY 
UNREASONABLENESS (1982). 
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erwise within the rule's ambit. Also, as long as third party rights are 
not adversely affected, an agency may waive the applicability of a rule 
to a particular individual on the ground that its application in that 
specific instance would be unfair or without value to the public interest. 
Further, the main principle embodied in a rule may be drawn as 
broadly or narrowly as an agency deems wise. A rule can also have as 
many narrowly drawn exceptions to its main principle as the issuing 
agency thinks prudent. In addition, agency application of a rule to a 
particular factual situation which is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the rule, or which otherwise causes an unreasonable result, may be suc-
cessfully challenged under almost all state administrative procedure acts 
because those statutes typically prohibit arbitrary or capricious agency 
action. Lastly, rules need not always eliminate the discretion of an 
agency to tailor its actions to particular factual circumstances. Indeed, 
rules may expressly confer such discretion on an agency and specify 
some or all of the factors that must be considered in exercising that 
discretion. 
In considering the desirability of a required preference for state 
agency rulemaking we should not forget that we have had decades of 
experience with agency lawmaking that was predominantly ad hoc. Ex-
perience demonstrates that abusive agency action is much more likely to 
result from ad hoc agency lawmaking than from lawmaking that is of 
general applicability. What we need, therefore, is a clear preference for 
agency lawmaking by rule in order to minimize low visibility agency 
decisionmaking of an arbitrary or capricious nature. 
It has been asserted that the "procedural advantages of rulemaking 
... are headed for extinction" because the courts and legislature have 
moved a great deal of rulemaking from informal notice and comment 
procedures, to much more formal trial-type procedures.43 If so, many of 
the arguments for a general rulemaking preference discussed earlier 
would be weakened. Note, however, that state agency rulemaking 
under the provisions of the 1961 MSAPA, which has been adopted by 
most states;" is of the simple notice and comment variety rather than 
the more complex hybrid or adjudicative variety found in many recent 
federal statutes governing particular agency rulemaking. 411 As a result, 
the procedural advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for most 
state agency lawmaking are not headed for extinction although, admit-
43. Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REG. July-Aug. 1981 at 25, 
26. 
44. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 3 at 387. 
45. See Rago, Rulemaking Under the Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Op-
portunity Missed, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 458-60 (1982). 
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tedly, they have been substantially diminished for many federal 
agencies. 
Prior discussion demonstrates that state agency lawmaking by rule 
is generally superior to state agency lawmaking by order. It also dem-
onstrates that the advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for ad-
ministrative lawmaking are greater, in a number of important respects, 
for state agencies than for federal agencies. First, state agency decisions 
in particular adjudications are virtually never published while the deci-
sions of many federal agencies are published. This makes public access 
to state agency case law much more difficult, in general, than public 
access to federal agency case law, or public access to state agency rules 
which are virtually always published. Second, the legislatures of most 
states have established comprehensive and effective means for the gu-
bernatorial and legislative review of state agency lawmaking by rule, 
while Congress has not established any similar scheme with which to 
review the rules of federal agencies. For this reason, there is a special 
need to ensure that state agencies (but not federal agencies) make their 
law primarily by rules which are subject to these elaborate review 
mechanisms rather than by orders which are not. Third, persons af-
fected by state agency proceedings are far less likely to be represented 
by lawyers than persons affected by federal agency proceedings. As a 
result, there is a greater need for state agencies than for federal agen-
cies to make agency law through rulemaking proceedings that do not 
usually require the use of the special skills of lawyers, than through 
adjudicatory proceedings where the use of the special skills of lawyers 
are often essential. Finally, the procedural advantages of rulemaking 
over adjudication for most agency lawmaking are greater for state agen-
cies than for federal agencies because virtually all state rulemaking is 
still of the simple notice and comment variety, while a great deal of the 
federal rulemaking authorized in recent years is of a hybrid variety 
and, therefore, is more complicated and expensive. All of these reasons 
suggest that a preference for agency lawmaking by rule is more justi-
fied for state agencies than for federal agencies. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that state agencies may not and should not 
dispense entirely with case-by-case lawmaking. There will always be 
some ambiguities in existing agency rules that will need to be answered 
in individual cases. The decisions in those cases will inevitably consti-
tute an ad hoc law of precedential value that will supplement agency 
rules. In addition, there will always be unforseen issues left unan-
swered by rules. Even good decisionmakers are not omniscient enough 
to anticipate all future problems that may arise within their jurisdic-
tion, and to solve them in advance by rule. So, for example, lawmaking 
in the course of adjudications may be warranted to deal with the perpe-
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trators of unforeseen harmful acts. Otherwise the perpetrator of such 
an act could not be stopped "until a rule against the practice was first 
adopted and he was then found to have engaged in the practice after 
adoption of the rule. " 46 
There are other situations in which agency lawmaking on a case-
by-case basis is the only possible or sensible way for an agency to pro-
ceed. Case-by-case agency lawmaking may be better than rulemaking, 
for example, in those particular situations in which the agency does not 
yet feel it is in a position to make generally applicable law because of 
the agency's current lack of expertise; or because the distinctions in the 
area are so numerous or complex that the agency is not yet in a posi-
tion to articulate them in the form of a generally applicable legal prin-
ciple; or because the lack of a concrete factual setting would make any 
general principle of law adopted too theoretical to be useful or sensible. 
Further, in some situations agency law made by adjudication may be 
superior to agency law made by rulemaking because adjudication is less 
likely to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive than rulemaking.47 That 
is, given the general inability of rules to deal with novel or unantici-
pated factual situations, and the great likelihood that rules will cover 
unnecessary or unintended circumstances because of their general ap-
plicability, lawmaking through adjudication may be "more cost-effec-
tive, less cumbersome, and more palatable politically" in some situa-
tions than agency lawmaking in the form of rules.'8 
It seems clear, therefore, that agency lawmaking by ad hoc adjudi-
cation can not and should not be entirely eliminated. Agencies must 
retain authority to make law on a case-by-case basis whenever, and to 
whatever extent, the use of rulemaking is genuinely infeasible or im-
practicable. However, in all other circumstances the advantages of 
rulemaking as compared to adjudication suggest that state agencies 
should be required to elaborate their law by rule, and should be pro-
hibited from relying primarily on adjudication for the performance of 
that function. Nevertheless, this duty should be subject to a moderating 
principle so that rulemaking would be required for this purpose only 
when, and to the extent, it is feasible and practicable under the circum-
stances. This means that state agencies authorized to issue rules and 
decide individual cases would lose their currently broad discretion to 
choose, freely, between rulemaking and adjudication in the making of 
their law. The two competing lawmaking modalities would no longer 
46. Scalia, supra note 43, at 28. 
47. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO fEDERAL AGENCY 
RULEMAKING 82-83 (1983). 
48. !d. at 83. 
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be co-equal choices. Agencies would be required to employ rulemaking 
rather than adjudication unless they could justify their assertion that 
the former could not reasonably be employed for the purpose in light of 
the relevent circumstances. 
It could be argued, however, that the price of enforcing such a 
duty on agencies, including the costs of all kinds that might result from 
any ambiguities in the precise scope of the obligation, would make the 
imposition of that duty undesirable. There is an answer to this criticism 
of a mandatory preference for state agency rulemaking. The costs flow-
ing from the imposition of such a requirement are unlikely to be as 
great as critics assert; and the many benefits of such a requirement 
indicated in prior discussion are, in any case, likely to far outweigh 
whatever costs the requirement is likely to engender. Few people sug-
gest, for example, that the almost universal prohibition against arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable agency action, should be eliminated 
because it costs too much to enforce that prohibition in absolute terms, 
or in relation to its benefits. As a result, imposition of a requirement 
that state agencies make as much of their law by rule as is feasible and 
practicable under the circumstances is fully justified. 
IV. JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS 
A. Generally 
A few state courts have restricted the general freedom of state 
agencies to choose between rulemaking and adjudication for the elabo-
ration of their law. These courts have required agencies in their respec-
tive jurisdictions to engage in lawmaking by rule rather than by order 
in various circumstances and to specified extents. They have, therefore, 
denied state agencies delegated the authority to issue rules and to decide 
individual cases the virtually unfettered opportunity those agencies had 
previously exercised to choose adjudication rather than rulemaking as 
the primary means of elaborating their law. The most unusual aspect 
of this preference for agency lawmaking by rule is that it has been 
created by the courts in the absence of any statute expressly requiring 
that result. Consequently, this preference for administrative rulemaking 
is wholly a product of judicial, rather than legislative, creativity. 
In considering court decisions requiring state agencies to use 
rulemaking rather than adjudication for specified lawmaking, care 
should be taken to distinguish from the subject at hand cases requiring 
agencies to follow rulemaking procedures rather than adjudicatory pro-
cedures in situations where an agency had attempted to issue a "rule" 
in an adjudication. As noted earlier, agencies must follow rulemaking 
procedures when they issue "rules"; they may not issue a statement 
161] AGENCY LAWMAKING BY RULE 181 
qualifying as a "rule" by using adjudicatory procedures. There are 
state cases in which an agency had issued a statement of law that quali-
fied as a de facto "rule" through the use of procedures appropriate only 
to ad hoc adjudication. The courts invalidated such agency action be-
cause it was required to be accomplished by the issuance of a de jure 
"rule" after appropriate rulemaking procedures. 49 Cases of this kind 
are inapposite to the present discussion.60 These cases cannot be cited 
49. See, e.g., the following line of New Jersey cases: Metromedia Inc. v. Director, Div. of 
Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 328-37, 478 A.2d 742, 748-755 (1984); Department of Envtl. Protection v. 
Stavola, 103 N.J. 425, 436-38, 511 A.2d 622, 628-29 (1986) (both cases apparently holding that 
the particular agency determinations of law involved were de facto rules, and, therefore, could not 
be applied to particular persons in the absence of the prior issuance of de jure rules adopted in 
conformance with applicable rulemaking procedures); Texter v. Department of Human Serv., 88 
N.J. 376, 443 A.2d 178 (1982) (impliedly suggesting that agencies could not issue a de facto rule 
amending an existing rule by an adjudicatory order but, instead, must do so, if it chooses to do so, 
by a rule subject to rulemaking procedures). Cf Airwork Serv. Div. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 
97 N.J. 290, 300-02 478 A.2d 729, 734, 735 (1984) (apparently holding that a particular agency 
determination was an order rather than a rule and, therefore, the agency could use adjudicatory 
procedures rather than rulemaking procedures for its issuance). 
It should be noted, however, that at least some of the language used by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court might suggest that agencies are required, in certain circumstances, to make law by 
de jure rules rather than by de jure orders, and that the agency action involved was held void not 
because it constituted a de facto rule adopted without benefit of required rulemaking procedures 
but, instead, because the agency failed to make law by rule in the first place. See 103 N.J. at 436-
39, 511 A.2d at 628-29. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of this entire line of New Jersey cases 
suggests that the latter reading of this language is probably incorrect because these cases presented 
situations in which the court believed that the agencies involved had improperly attempted to issue 
de facto rules without following required rulemaking procedures. See also 613 Corp. v. Division 
of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 510 A.2d 103 (1986), discussed infra note 139. 
Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 183 A.2d 64 (1962), is a peculiar New Jersey 
case because it is difficult to ascertain from an isolated reading of that opinion whether the agency 
action involved was invalid because it was a de facto rule that was issued without the benefit of 
rulemaking procedures, id. at 155, 183 A.2d at 73 (action here "amounts to ad hoc legislation"), 
or because the agency enabling act required it to make law on the particular subject involved by 
rule rather than by order, id. at 154, 183 A.2d at 72 ("We are unable to divine a legislative intent 
to empower ad hoc lawmaking in the [specific] categories in which the promulgation of general 
rules and regulations is authorized"), or because the court exercised an inherent judicial authority 
to invalidate as unfair administrative lawmaking by ad hoc order when the agency in question was 
also authorized to engage in such lawmaking by rule, id. at 155; 183 A.2d at 73 ("Where an 
administrative agent is given full rule-making power, he must, in all fairness, bottom an alleged 
violation on general legislation before he may rule in a particular case"). However, a later case 
appears to make clear that the reason for the insistence of the court in Boller Beverages that the 
agency was required to make the law involved through rulemaking proceedings and could not do 
so by ad hoc order was that the agency determination in question was of "general applicability" 
and, therefore, was a rule de facto but not de jure. Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 
97 N.J. 313, 329, 478 A.2d 742, 750 (1984). 
50. There is also an inapposite but interesting line of Florida cases that might be misread to 
suggest that a court may require an agency delegated authority to make law by adjudication as 
well as by rulemaking to do so by rule in specified situations. However, the actual holding of these 
cases is far more limited and makes them inapposite to the subject of this section-the authority of 
courts to require agencies to prefer rulemaking over adjudication for their lawmaking in specified 
circumstances. In fact, these Florida cases hold that an agency authorized to make law either by 
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for the proposition that a court has required an agency to make its law, 
in specified circumstances, by rule rather than by order; instead, they 
may only be cited for the proposition that when an agency issues a 
statement that in fact qualifies as a "rule," it must do so by the use of 
rulemaking procedures, and cannot do so through the use of adjudica-
tory procedures. 
There are, however, state cases explicitly holding on one basis or 
another that state agencies must, in specified situations, engage in law-
making by rule rather than by order. In those situations, courts have 
insisted that the agency must make its law in a form that qualifies as a 
"rule" and by procedures appropriate to the issuance of a "rule," and 
may not choose to do so in a form that qualifies as an "order" and by 
procedures that are appropriate to the issuance of an "order." These 
cases are the focus of this section because these cases establish, to one 
extent or another, a preference for agency lawmaking by rule. 
In three respects this state court development has been quite lim-
ited. First, it has occurred only in a handful of states. Second, the judi-
cial imposition of a mandatory preference for state agency rulemaking 
has been justified on several different bases, some of which are dubious. 
Third, the required rulemaking obligations imposed on agencies by 
state courts have been narrow in scope, so they do not satisfy the need 
for a broad-scoped, general preference for state agency lawmaking by 
rule. As a result, these judicial developments are not an adequate sub-
stitute for an express legislative solution to this problem. Absent such a 
solution, however, some of these judicial developments seem more 
promising than others, and are worthy of emulation by other state 
courts. 
rulemaking or by adjudication may do so by adjudication only if the record of the adjudicatory 
proceeding contains fully adequate reasons and factual support for the ad hoc law it creates, and 
the parties to the proceeding were given an opportunity to challenge the foundation for the new 
case law principle adjudicated therein. These cases, then, do not prohibit agency lawmaking by ad 
hoc order; instead, they insist that such a policymaking order may be de jure only if it is backed 
by fully adequate justifications in the record of the adjudicatory proceeding. See McDonald v. 
Department of Banking and Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 582-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981); Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 
1980); Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Telephone System, Inc. 435 So. 2d 892, 895-96 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
A perusal of these Florida cases will indicate, however, that the Florida courts have not been 
reluctant to suggest situations in which they believed agency lawmaking by rule was preferable to 
lawmaking by order. But they have not required agencies to make their law by de jure rule rather 
than by de jure order in such situations in the absence of a provision in an agency's enabling act 
mandating that they do so by rule. See A. ENGLAND AND H. LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 9.05, 9.07, 12.24 (1979). 
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B. Principle of Statutory Construction 
The Oregon Supreme Court has devised the most defensible justi-
fication for a court to impose on agencies, in the absence of an express 
statutory requirement, a fairly broad obligation to prefer rulemaking 
over adjudication for administrative lawmaking. Although this obliga-
tion originated in Oregon cases involving occupational licensing, it ap-
pears to have a broader application and common sense legitimacy. The 
rulemaking obligation announced by the Oregon Supreme Court is em-
bodied in a general principle of statutory construction. That general 
principle is this: In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, a 
legislature is presumed to have intended agencies that have been dele-
gated express authority to issue rules and express or implied authority 
to decide individual cases, subject to a vague statutory standard, to elab-
orate that statutory standard by rule rather than by order, as soon as 
feasible and to the extent practicable. The justification for this judi-
cially imposed rulemaking obligation is a putative legislative intention 
based on the assumption that a reasonable legislature under the circum-
stances defined by this principle would be likely to have intended that 
result if it had considered the question. 
The many substantial reasons indicated earlier for generally pre-
ferring rulemaking over adjudication for state agency lawmaking justify 
the reasonableness of this judicial assumption. The reasonableness of 
this assumption about legislative intentions is also supported by the two 
criteria defining the applicability of this principle-a legislative delega-
tion of lawmaking power to an agency under a vague statutory stan-
dard and an express delegation to that agency of authority to imple-
ment its powers by rule. The legislature should have understood that a 
delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency under a vague statu-
tory standard would necessarily require significant agency refinement 
and elaboration of that standard. Further express delegation to the 
agency of rulemaking power appears to suggest that rulemaking should 
be used as the principal surrogate for the legislature's inaction in fur-
ther refining and elaborating the statutory standard. The fact that an 
agency in such circumstances was also expressly or impliedly vested 
with adjudicatory power is easily explained by the need to provide a 
means by which the agency-created law could be enforced against par-
ticular violators. In the described situation, therefore, the vesting of ad-
judicatory power in an agency is not necessarily any indication that the 
legislature was willing to permit the agency to elaborate the vague stat-
utory standard primarily by order rather than by rule. Of course, if this 
judicial assumption of legislative intention turns out to be unwarranted, 
the legislature can quickly remedy it by statute. 
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A better understanding of the justification, nature, and scope of the 
judicially imposed rulemaking requirement in Oregon can be obtained 
from an analysis of the principal Oregon Supreme Court case on the 
subject. Megdal v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners61 required the 
Oregon Supreme Court to review an order of the State Board of Dental 
Examiners revoking Megdal's dental license on the ground that he had 
engaged in "unprofessional conduct."62 The conduct deemed "unprofes-
sional" consisted of an intentional misrepresentation by Megdal when 
he obtained malpractice insurance. In the process of securing the insur-
ance, Megdal had stated that certain dentists were employed by him in 
his Oregon practice when, in fact, they were employed by him in his 
California practice.63 Megdal argued that the "unprofessional conduct" 
standard contained in the agency enabling act was too vague to be ap-
plied to him without prior agency elaboration of its specific contours by 
rule. 64 
The Oregon Supreme Court initially rejected a claim that the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the agency to 
elaborate the "unprofessional conduct" statutory standard by rule prior 
to its application."" The court then determined that the legislature in-
tended the Board to create its own more specific standards for "unpro-
fessional conduct" rather than to rely upon more specific standards of 
conduct currently recognized in that profession,"• or adopted by the leg-
islature in the language of the statute.67 Finally, the court concluded 
that in creating more specific standards pursuant to this delegation of 
lawmaking authority, the agency was required to do so primarily by 
rule rather than by order because the legislature intended that result. 
In justifying its conclusion that the Board was required to elabo-
rate the statutory standard by rule prior to its application in a particu-
lar case, the Oregon Supreme Court first noted that the agency ena-
bling act provided that the Board was expressly authorized to "make 
and enforce rules ... for regulating the practice of dentistry.""8 While 
the enabling act did not unambiguously indicate that rules of the Board 
must be used to give more specific content to the "unprofessional con-
duct" standard, "there are reasons to believe this is the legislative pol-
51. 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980). 
52. The enabling act explicitly authorized revocation of dental licenses for "unprofessional 
conduct." See Or. Rev. Stat. §679.140 (l)(c) and (5)(d) (1987). 
53. 288 Or. at 295, 605 P.2d at 274. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. at 296-303, 605 P.2d at 274-78. 
56. /d. at 306, 605 P.2d at 280. 
57. /d. at 308-11, 605 P.2d at 281-82. 
58. /d. at 311, 605 P.2d at 282 (construing Or. Rev. Stat. §679.250 (7) (1987)). 
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icy."119 Those reasons included the need to assure fair notice to licensees 
of the specific conduct that might cause loss of their licenses.60 The 
court went on to note that the legislature had made the policy of re-
quired rulemaking express in over thirty occupational licensing stat-
utes, while it did not do so in the enabling act of the Board of Dental 
Examiners.61 It believed this fact to be irrelevant, however, because 
"the difference of the potential impact, when one occupation is given 
fair notice of obligatory standards of propriety by prior rulemaking and 
another occupation is given no such prior notice, is too pronounced to 
be attributed to the legislature without some showing that it was in-
tended."62 As a result, the court concluded that the agency must elabo-
rate the standard of "unprofessional conduct" primarily by rule, even 
in the absence of an express legislative direction. Its conclusion was 
based on the following principle: "[W]hen a licensing statute contains 
both a broad standard of 'unprofessional conduct' that is not fully de-
fined in the statute itself and also authority to make rules for the con-
duct of the regulated occupation, the legislative purpose is to provide 
for the further specification of the standard by rules, unless a different 
understanding is shown."63 
In light of this principle, the failure of the Board of Dental Exam-
iners to issue rules further elaborating the statutory "unprofessional 
conduct" standard and to proscribe by rule the type of conduct for 
which Megdal's license had been revoked, was fatal. As a result, the 
court held that the revocation of his license in these circumstances was 
improper.64 After all, "when the statute itself offers no further defini-
tion, the legislative delegation to the agency calls for such questions to 
be resolved in principle by rules rather than being confronted and dis-
puted for the first time in charging a particular respondent directly 
under a conclusory term such as 'unprofessional conduct.' " 611 
The court was careful, however, to make clear that it was not re-
quiring the impossible. It pointed out that any requirement that the 
agency "catalogue" by rule every kind of "professional misconduct" 
might well be "infeasible."66 As a consequence, the principle on which 
the decision rested did not require rules imitating a "detailed criminal 
59. /d. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. at 311-12, 605 P.2d at 282. 
62. /d. at 313, 605 P.2d at 283. 
63. /d. at 313-14, 605 P.2d at 283. 
64. /d. at 321, 605 P.2d at 287. 
65. /d. at 315, 605 P.2d at 284. 
66. /d. at 314, 605 P.2d at 283-84 (quoting Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or. 
441, 448, 378 P.2d 945, 948 (1963)). 
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code."67 Instead, what was necessary was rulemaking adequate "to 
serve the two purposes of giving notice of censurable conduct and con-
fining disciplinary administration to the announced standards."68 The 
agency could accomplish its need to regulate adequately the profession 
and to accomplish those purposes without resorting to unhelpful rules 
containing a "catchall clause that is as general as the standard it pur-
ports to elucidate."69 It could, for example, indicate the particular types 
of relationships covered by the term "unprofessional conduct." In the 
end, therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court required rulemaking in 
these circumstances only as soon as feasible and to the extent 
practicable. 
Three members of the Oregon Supreme Court specially concurred 
in the result of the Megdal case-but on grounds that were signifi-
cantly different from those noted above.70 These Justices agreed that 
the Board of Dental Examiners should be required to elaborate the 
statutory standard of "unprofessional conduct" by rule prior to pro-
ceeding against Megdal in a particular case. They disagreed, however, 
with the imputed legislative intent analysis of the majority opinion.71 
The author of the concurring opinion stated that while he agreed the 
Board was required to elaborate the statutory standard of "unprofes-
sional conduct" by rules, it was "a fiction to hold that the statutory 
scheme and legislative history" compelled that result.72 His view was 
that it is "more realistic to hold that the court, pursuant to its power to 
review the decisions of the Board, is empowered to require the promul-
gation of such standards [by rule]."73 
To justify the conclusion that a reviewing court has authority to 
create a common-law requirement that agencies must elaborate their 
law primarily by rule rather than by order in circumstances where the 
potential sanction for violation of a statutory standard is "severe," the 
statutory standard is "particularly vague," and the standard is not illu-
minated by "a well understood meaning,"74 the concurring opinion ini-
tially relied upon a statement by Kenneth Culp Davis. Davis had writ-
ten that a reviewing court had inherent authority to create a common 
law requiring agencies to adopt "rules to guide the exercise of [their] 
67. 288 Or. at 314, 605 P.2d at 284 (1980). 
68. /d. at 314, 605 P.2d at 284. 
69. /d. 
70. !d. at 321-24, 605 P.2d at 287-88 (Denecke, C.J., Tongue and Peterson, JJ., specially 
concurring). 
71. /d. 
72. !d. at 321, 605 P.2d at 287 (Denecke, C.J. concurring). 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 323-24, 605 P.2d at 288. 
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administrative discretion."711 However, Davis did not mention any spe-
cific legitimating authority for that proposition other than the desirabil-
ity of the result. The concurring opinion in Megdal also relied upon an 
earlier Oregon Court of Appeals case for the conclusion that a court 
could create this requirement wholly on the basis of its common-law 
powers.76 In Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 77 the intermediate appellate court of Oregon reviewed the 
denial of a liquor license by a state agency. The agency had relied upon 
a statute authorizing the denial of such a license if there were "suffi-
cient licensed premises in the locality" and the license was not required 
by the "public interest or convenience."78 The court of appeals invali-
dated the action of the agency on the ground that the agency had not 
previously adopted rules elaborating these broad and vague statutory 
standards.79 The court stated that a "legislative delegation of power in 
broad statutory language such as the phrase 'demanded by public inter-
est or convenience' places upon the administrative agency a responsibil-
ity to establish standards by which that law is to be applied. The legis-
lature has provided for such rulemaking in the Administrative 
Procedure Act."80 A commentator has suggested a number of reasons 
for the conclusion of the court in Sun Ray Dairy that the agency must 
elaborate the statutory standard by rule before it may apply the stan-
dard in a particular case. Those reasons included the fact that 
rulemaking: 
(1) permitted public scrutiny of agency policy; (2) assured greater 
public confidence; (3) permitted interested parties to be heard in the 
formulation of policy; (4) permitted applicants to know in advance the 
standards of consideration; (5) assured even-handed treatment; (6) 
provided consistency in internal agency treatment of cases resolved 
without litigation; (7) enabled parties and decision makers in a con-
tested case to know what facts must be demonstrated or found; and 
(8) minimized inconsistent, ad hoc, or ad hominim decisions. The 
court also emphasized the key interrelationship between written stan-
dards and adequate scrutiny of agency decisions through informed 
legislative oversight and probing judicial review.81 
75. /d. at 322, 605 P.2d at 288 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 
§ 6.13 at 225 (1976)). 
76. Id. 
77. 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973). 
78. Id. at 65, 517 P.2d at 290. 
79. Id. at 70, 517 P.2d at 292. 
80. Id. at 70, 517 P.2d at 292-93 (citations omitted). 
81. Frohnmayer, supra note 36, at 442 (quoting Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 16 Or. App. 63, 72-75, 517 P.2d 289, 293-94 (1973)). 
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The court in Sun Ray Dairy did not, however, indicate the specific 
source of its authority to require such rulemaking. 
The concurring opinion in Megdal assumed that the order of the 
court in Sun Ray Dairy prohibiting the agency from "act[ing] on the 
application until it had adopted rules governing the issuance of li-
censes"82 was based entirely on a "common law principle" created by 
that court in the exercise of its inherent judicial powers, rather than on 
the putative intention of the legislature.83 This assumption seems un-
justified. As noted earlier, the opinion of the court in the Sun Ray 
Dairy case did not indicate the precise source of its authority to require 
such rulemaking. Consequently, the result in Sun Ray Dairy may be 
viewed as resting upon a judicial assumption that the legislature im-
pliedly intended the agency to elaborate the principal contours of that 
vague statutory standard by rule rather than by order. If that is so, the 
Sun Ray Dairy case is consistent with the approach of the Megdal ma-
jority opinion rather than with the approach of the Megdal concurring 
opmwn. 
Further support for the putative legislative intention approach of 
the majority opinion in Megdal can also be found in the admission of 
the concurring opinion in Megdal that "the legislature did not address 
the issue of whether the Dental Board must promulgate rules defining 
'unprofessional conduct.' "84 Consequently, neither the relevant legisla-
tive history nor the relevant statutory text precluded the otherwise ra-
tional and functional assumption announced in the majority opinion 
that the legislature would have intended the agency, in these circum-
stances, to elaborate the statutory standard primarily by rule, if it had 
actually addressed the issue. The soundest conclusion, therefore, is that 
reached by the majority rather than the concurring opinion in Megdal. 
It should be stressed that court-required rulemaking that is based 
upon an implied legislative intention has clearer legitimacy than court 
required rulemaking that is based wholly on the inherent powers of the 
judicial branch. This is so because the authority of the legislature to 
require agencies to make law by rule rather than by order is much 
clearer than the authority of the courts to impose such a requirement 
on agencies entirely on the basis of the courts' inherent powers to as-
sure the effectiveness of judicial review.86 An implied legislative inten-
82. 288 Or. at 323, 605 P.2d at 288. 
83. The concurring opinion in Megdal states that "[a]ttempting to reach the same result by 
interpreting the statute in my opinion can result, as I think it has in this case, in a very strained 
interpretation of a statute." /d. 
84. /d. at 322, 605 P.2d at 287. 
85. Professor Davis may also have suggested that courts have some inherent authority ancil-
lary to their review powers over administrative action to require agencies in some situations to 
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tion approach to this problem also has the virtue of inviting legislative 
intervention in situations where the attributed legislative intention 
proves to be misplaced; and it has the additional virtue of assigning to 
the legislature an intention that is entirely reasonable and functional in 
light of the special advantages of agency lawmaking by rule as com-
pared to agency lawmaking by ad hoc order. 
Broadly stated, the principle established by the Megdal case is 
this: In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the legislature is 
presumed to intend an agency that has been delegated express authority 
to issue rules and express or implied authority to decide individual 
cases, subject to a vague statutory standard, to elaborate that statutory 
standard by rule rather than by order, as soon as feasible and to the 
extent practicable. This presumption would enable the courts, in the 
absence of statutes expressly mandating that result, to require agencies 
in such situations to elaborate the major contours of their law by 
rulemaking rather than by adjudication, but only to the extent that 
rulemaking is not disfunctional under the circumstances. However, 
even when it is stated in these broad terms, the Megdal principle does 
not fully satisfy the need for a general mandatory preference for agency 
lawmaking by rule. 
First, the Megdal principle appears to be limited to situations in 
which agency lawmaking occurs pursuant to a statute containing a 
vague standard and, therefore, it is inapplicable to a great deal of 
engage in lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 7:26 at 131 (2d ed. 1979). The justification for the judicial imposition of such a 
common law requirement wholly on the basis of inherent judicial power is unclear, but it may 
relate to the need of reviewing courts to ascertain whether or not particular agency action is 
consistent with agency law or practice and, therefore, is reasonable, or is inconsistent with agency 
law or practice and, therefore, is arbitrary or capricious, within the meaning of the review stan-
dards incorporated in the agency enabling act or in the state administrative procedure act. In 
addition, or in the alternative, the authority of a court to require agency rulemaking in some 
situations may relate to a perception of inherent judicial power to ensure, generally, that agencies 
act in a reasonable rather than in an arbitrary manner. The court, therefore, may have inherent 
authority over an agency's choice of lawmaking modality since this very choice may be arbitrary or 
capricious in particular circumstances. 
In any event, in addition to the Megdal concurring opinion, a number of state cases hint at 
the existence of a common law judicial power to require agency lawmaking by rule in particular 
circumstances. Other cases state that courts have the power to impose rulemaking requirements in 
particular circumstances. These cases do not indicate any source for this judicial authority over 
agency lawmaking, thereby creating the inference that such authority derives from inherent judi-
cial powers. One such case may be Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 155, 183 A.2d 64, 
73 (1962), (stating that the agency must "in all fairness, bottom an alleged violation on general 
legislation before ... [it] may rule in a particular case" in situations where the "agency has been 
given full rule-making power."). However, Boller Beverages can be explained on a basis other 
than the inherent common law power of a court to require an agency to engage in lawmaking by 
rule rather than lawmaking by order in such circumstances. See supra note 49. 
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agency lawmaking that occurs under statutory standards that are not of 
that character. Second, the Megdal principle is also apparently limited 
to situations in which the agency delegated lawmaking authority under 
a vague statutory standard has expressly been delegated authority to 
implement its powers by rule and, therefore, it is inapplicable to a 
great deal of agency lawmaking that occurs in situations where 
rulemaking powers may only be implied. However, because the 
rulemaking requirement of Megdal is based upon an assumed legisla-
tive intention, the vague statutory standard and the express delegation 
of rulemaking authority may be desirable or even essential criteria in 
light of the need to justify the reasonableness of that assumption. In 
any case, to the extent these limitations on the otherwise desirable 
Megdal doctrine persist, they indicate that it is not a fully satisfactory 
substitute for a more broad-scoped mandatory preference for agency 
lawmaking by rule. 
Even more disappointing than the inadequacy of an expansive 
reading of the Megdal doctrine for present purposes is the failure of the 
Oregon Supreme Court to read that doctrine as expansively as it might 
have. Indeed, the recent Oregon Supreme Court case of Trebesch v. 
Employment Division86 may have narrowed the potential applicability 
of the rule of construction first announced in Megdal. If this is so, it is 
unfortunate, and further supports the urgent need for a statutory solu-
tion to this problem. 
In Trebesch the issue was whether the agency "was required to 
promulgate a rule defining the statutory phrase 'systematic and sus-
tained effort to obtain work' before it could deny claimant extended 
unemployment benefits for failing to fulfill the statutory require-
ment."87 Although the court's resolution of the issue in this particular 
case was ambiguous,88 its analysis and elaboration of the Megdal prin-
ciple suggests an unwillingness to engage in its broad generalization. 
After identifying the issue in Trebesch, the court noted that the answer 
to this question could not be found in the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, in a common law of judicial review, or in any 
86. 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1985). 
87. Jd. at 266, 710 P.2d at 137. 
88. The court held that if the responsible agency official 
perceive[s] himself to have comprehensive review powers to consider interpretations of 
law ... the term must be interpreted by rule and the absence of a rule before applica-
tion to this claimant would compel reversal. On the other hand, [if he does not have 
such powers, he] may address the standards required for an adequate work search by 
order on reconsideration in light of the facts of this case. 
Id. at 277, 710 P.2d at 143. 
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provision of the state Administrative Procedure Act.89 "Rather, the an-
swer is a matter of statutory interpretation, the relevant statutes being 
those regulating the particular agency whose action is challenged."90 
The role of the courts was to explain the "methodology" by which one 
may determine whether the legislature intended the agency to engage in 
lawmaking by rule rather than by order in a particular situation.91 
Trebesch began its analysis of the Megdal principle by noting that 
the case "does not mean that all [statutory] terms delegating policymak-
ing discretion [to an agency] can be applied only after rulemaking."92 
The legislature may, of course, expressly require an agency to elaborate 
a particular statutory term by rule prior to its application in a particu-
lar case.93 When that happens, the job of the court is easy. However, 
absent such an express directive, 
the breadth and kind of responsibility delegated to the agency by the 
statutory term (fact-finding, applying an ambiguous law, or develop-
ing policy) will be one, but not a dispositive, factor which may indi-
cate an implicit directive from the legislature for rulemaking. In addi-
tion, the tasks the agency is responsible for accomplishing, and the 
structure by which the agency performs its mandated tasks, all of 
which are specified in an agency's authorizing legislation, must be 
examined as a whole in order to discern the legislature's intent with 
regard to rulemaking.94 
Therefore, in the Trebesch case, the Oregon Supreme Court con-
strued the Megdal principle to mean that in situations where the legis-
lature has not expressly indicated its intentions with respect to 
mandatory agency rulemaking, courts must determine those intentions 
by analyzing a number of factors. These factors include "the character 
of the statutory term," "the authority delegated and the tasks assigned 
to the agencies," and "the structure by which the agencies execute their 
tasks."911 While the Court does not explain exactly how these factors 
are to be applied, the court is clear that they must all be considered in 
an effort to ascertain the legislature's putative intention. 
One can hardly object to the fairness of this multi-factored, contex-
tual approach to assigning a putative legislative intention with respect 
89. /d. at 267, 710 P.2d at 137-38. 
90. /d. at 267, 710 P.2d at 138. The court noted that the state administrative procedure act 
only provided uniform procedures for the making of rules rather than mandating a preference for 
agency lawmaking by rule. 
91. /d. 
92. /d. at 270, 710 P.2d at 139. 
93. /d. 
94. /d., (emphasis added). 
95. !d. at 270, 710 P.2d 139-40. 
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to the duty of an agency to engage in lawmaking by rule when the 
relevant statutes do not expressly resolve that question. But it should be 
noted that this approach would substitute a full-scale, particularized 
inquiry producing unpredictable and inconsistent results, for a broad 
rule of construction based on Megdal that would be easier to apply and 
that would yield relatively predictable and consistent results. In light of 
the significant advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for agency 
lawmaking, courts would be warranted in conveying the following mes-
sage to the legislature: Whenever statutes are facially silent with re-
spect to the obligation of a particular agency to elaborate a vague statu-
tory term by rule rather than by order, courts will assume that the 
legislature intended the agency to do so, as soon as feasible and to the 
extent practicable, by rule, in all situations in which the legislature 
explicitly vested the agency with rulemaking authority. If the legisla-
ture does not believe that principle of construction is accurate generally, 
or in particular situations, it can alter it by statute. But unless the leg-
islature does so, such a principle of construction is more reasonable, 
functional, and practical than a multi-factored, in-depth analysis of 
probable legislative intent on this question of the kind adopted by the 
recent Trebesch case. 
C. Due Process Requirement 
The highest courts of several states have suggested another possi-
ble basis for a judicially imposed preference for agency lawmaking by 
rule. They have indicated that in some circumstances the failure of an 
agency to elaborate its law by rule prior to the application of that law 
in a particular case may constitute a denial of due process. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court actually invalidated particular agency action on 
due process grounds because it was convinced that the agency's failure 
to elaborate its law by rule was so unfair in the circumstances as to be 
unconstitutional. In Elizondo v. Department of Revenue, 96 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court reviewed the action of the Motor Vehicle Division 
of the State Department of Revenue suspending Elizondo's driver's li-
cense and denying his request for a probationary license during the 
suspension period.97 The statute authorizing the Department to issue 
probationary licenses during a suspension did not indicate the criteria 
the Department should use when it determined whether to issue proba-
tionary licenses in particular cases.98 The Department was authorized, 
96. 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518 (1977). 
97. ld. at 115, 570 P.2d at 519-20. 
98. Id. at 116, 570 P.2d at 520. 
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but not required, by its enabling act to issue rules to facilitate the exe-
cution of its licensing functions. Despite this authority, the Department 
had issued no rules to guide its hearing officers when they decided 
whether to grant or deny probationary drivers' licenses.99 
The Supreme Court of Colorado held in Elizondo that "due pro-
cess requires ... the Department of Revenue [to] promulgate rules ... 
to guide hearing officers in their decisions regarding requests for proba-
tionary licenses," and that "these rules ... must be sufficiently specific 
to inform the public what factors will be considered relevant by De-
partment hearing officers, so that requests for probationary licenses 
may be supported by relevant evidence and arguments."100 This conclu-
sion was justified in these circumstances because the Department's fail-
ure to issue rules specifying the criteria for the issuance or denial of a 
probationary license 
has left the granting or denial of probationary drivers' licenses solely 
to the unfettered discretion of individual hearing officers. As a result, 
neither the public nor the courts have any means of knowing in ad-
vance what evidence might be considered material to any particular 
decision. Nor is there any assurance that each hearing officer will not, 
consciously or subconsciously, follow standards quite different from 
those applied by his or her colleagues. 101 
As a result, the situation was so unfair that it amounted to an unconsti-
tutional denial of due process of law. The court in Elizondo cited no 
United States Supreme Court cases to support its conclusion that the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the Depart-
ment to structure the agency's discretion to issue probationary licenses 
by rule rather than by ad hoc order. However, the Colorado Supreme 
Court did cite a number of lower federal court cases102 and two state 
supreme court cases as a basis for such a requirement. 103 
Elizondo appears to be correct that in some situations an agency's 
previous failure to elaborate its law by rule may be so unfair as to 
99. /d. See also id. at 118; 570 P.2d at 521 ("By failing to follow that statutory suggestion" 
that it issue rules confining its discretion, the Department acted so unfairly as to violate due 
process) (emphasis supplied). 
100. !d. at 118-19, 570 P.2d at 522. 
101. /d. at 118, 570 P.2d at 521. 
102. Id. at 118-19, 570 P.2d at 522 (citing Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 
262 (2d Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 
605 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Santa Clara v. Kleppe, 418 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Eaker-
Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); St. Augustine High School v. Louisiana 
High School Athletic Ass'n, 270 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. La. 1967); Smith v. Ladner, 288 F. Supp. 66 
(S.D. Miss. 1966)). 
103. !d. (citing City of Atlanta v. Hill, 238 Ga. 413, 233 S.E.2d 193 (1977); Pennsylvania 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 292 A.2d 277 (1972)). 
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preclude specific agency action against a person in a particular case. 
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the fourteenth amendment 
due process clause requires state agencies to elaborate all delegations to 
them of lawmaking authority under vague statutory standards by rule 
rather than by ad hoc decision before they may be exercised in particu-
lar cases. The Alaska Supreme Court has noted, for example, that 
"[t]he process of making new law in the course of an administrative 
adjudication does not constitute a per se violation of due process," and 
that "[t]he adequacy of process does not [necessarily] depend on the 
advance adoption of standards."104 The Alaska Supreme Court has also 
indicated, however, that it would require agency elaboration of its law 
by rule "to the extent necessary to assure a fair administrative pro-
cess."1011 But it has not indicated when a "fair administrative process" 
might require such rulemaking except to note that "vagueness or lack 
of notice" might in particular circumstances induce that result. 106 
The majority opinion in the Oregon Megdal case is also instruc-
tive in this regard. The court in that case rejected the claim that the 
revocation of an occupational license on the grounds of "unprofessional 
conduct" was a violation of due process in a situation where that vague 
statutory term had not been further defined by agency rules. 107 In deal-
ing with the due process issue, the Megdal court noted that due process 
prohibited the imposition of penal sanctions for the violation of an ex-
cessively vague law, and that it prohibited the retrospective creation of 
crimes.108 Consequently, agency lawmaking that is the basis for impos-
ing penal sanctions must be executed by rule to the extent necessary to 
provide fair notice of the specific conduct subject to punishment, and to 
the extent necessary to avoid the ex post facto creation of criminal con-
duct. However, these arguments for requiring administrative lawmak-
ing by rule rather than by ad hoc order are applicable only to the ad-
ministration of laws whose violations are subject to penal sanctions. 
They are not helpful tools with which to require administrative law-
making by rule in schemes that cannot be characterized as penal. 109 
Nevertheless, the Oregon court in Megdal admitted there was 
some support for the proposition "that a prior specification of grounds 
should be a prerequisite of due process in administrative as well as 
104. Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n, 711 P.2d 1170, 1178 
(Alaska 1986). 
105. Id. 
106. /d. 
107. Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 296-303, 605 P.2d 
273, 27 4-78 (1980). 
108. /d. at 299, 605 P.2d at 276. 
109. /d. at 300, 605 P.2d at 276. 
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penal deprivations."110 It also recognized that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania had joined together two otherwise unrelated proposi-
tions-the notion that a penal statute must provide fair notice of the 
conduct it prohibits and the notion that access to a governmentally reg-
ulated occupation is protected by due processm-to produce a new 
principle. According to that principle, the grounds to revoke an occupa-
tional license "for 'grossly unprofessional conduct' must be limited to 
those further spelled out in the statute or in [agency] rules, because 
'revocation of licenses and permits for conduct not specifically defined 
or prohibited by the statute, would render the statute unconstitutional 
on grounds of vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' " 112 But the majority opinion in the Oregon 
Megdal case noted that there was no support in the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court for the conclusion of the Pennsylvania 
court that the standards utilized in the administration of occupational 
110. /d. at 301, 605 P.2d at 277 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVEN-
TIES 28, 224 (1976), and Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. 
REV. 1097, 1104-06 (1973)). 
111. 288 Or. at 301, 605 P.2d at 277 (construing Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 292 A.2d 277 (1972)). 
112. /d. (citing Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 198-99, 292 
A.2d 277, 282 (1982) ). 
This case held invalid an order of the Board of Pharmacy suspending a pharmacist's license 
for one year and revoking indefinitely his pharmacist's permit. See id. The pharmacist in question 
did not violate any of the thirteen specific grounds constituting "grossly unprofessional conduct" 
that were listed in the agency's enabling act or any rules of the agency. /d. at 195-96, 292 A.2d at 
280. The court held, first, that the thirteen specific grounds constituting "grossly unprofessional 
conduct" were intended by the legislature to be exhaustive and, therefore, the agency could not 
add to them by any further lawmaking on the basis of the statutory term "unprofessional con-
duct." See id. at 196-98, 292 A.2d at 280-81. The court held, second, that the agency could 
suspend or revoke licenses for additional reasons "upon proof of violation of any properly adopted 
rules ... promulgated by the Board." /d. at 197-98, 292 A.2d at 281. But, the court noted, it was 
"only by means of these statutorily granted rule-making powers that the Legislature has empow-
ered the Board to provide additional grounds for sanctions," and the Board had not done so. /d. at 
198, 292 A.2d at 281-82. The result in this Pennsylvania case, therefore, was wholly a product of 
statutory interpretation rather than a requirement of due process. 
However, in deciding that the legislature had limited the Board's authority to suspend or to 
revoke such licenses to those enumerated in the agency enabling act and to those enumerated in its 
rules, the court indicated that this construction of the agency enabling act was influenced by con-
stitutional considerations. The court stated that the creation of additional grounds for license sus-
pension or revocation through retroactive agency lawmaking by adjudication would present serious 
due process, fair notice, and void-for-vagueness problems. See id. at 198, 199, 292 A.2d at 282. In 
arriving at that conclusion the court stressed that the licensing statute in question imposed "sanc-
tions" and, therefore, "must satisfy the requirements of notice and a clear description of what is 
prohibited conduct [imposed] on all penal statutes by the Fourteenth Amendment." /d. at 199, 292 
A.2d at 282. That is why it concluded that "[t}he function of prohibiting new conduct or practices 
in the pharmacy profession rests with the Legislature or with the Board through its rule-making 
authority." /d. at 202, 292 A.2d at 284. 
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licensing laws "must meet those for penal laws."113 The court in 
Megdal did note that there were some lower federal court cases that 
might be viewed as requiring agencies delegated lawmaking authority 
of a nonpenal nature under a vague statutory term to elaborate that 
term by rule before they sought to apply it in particular cases. 114 N ev-
ertheless, it deemed these cases to be "inconclusive" and refused to find 
that the Board of Dental Examiners had acted unconstitutionally be-
cause it revoked Megdal's license on the grounds of "unprofessional 
conduct" in the absence of agency rules further refining the meaning of 
that statutory term. 1111 
However, on the basis of the cases deemed "inconclusive" by the 
court in the Oregon Megdal case, Kenneth Culp Davis has argued that 
"[t]he law may be in the early stages of a massive movement toward 
judicially required rulemaking that will reduce discretion that is un-
guided by rules or precedents."116 This new law will allow agencies 
that use systems of precedents to continue to rely upon them rather 
than rules. On the other hand, "agencies without systems of precedents 
may be judicially required to use their rulemaking power to provide 
guiding standards."117 The purpose of the development described by 
Davis is to ensure that agencies structure the exercise of their discre-
tionary powers by the adoption of standards that will reduce the likeli-
hood that those powers will be exercised in a wholly arbitrary manner. 
Davis notes that this development could be partly based on the idea 
that "in some circumstances the lack of rules or standards is so unrea-
sonable that due process is denied."118 For this proposition he cites sev-
eral cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals. 
The first of these lower federal court cases cited by Davis was 
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority. 119 That case involved a 
state agency that processed a huge volume of applications for public 
housing. In doing so, the agency denied approximately eight applica-
tions for each one granted. 120 Yet, the agency had no ascertainable stan-
113. 288 Or. at 302, 605 P.2d at 277. 
114. See id. at 303, 605 P.2d at 278 (citing Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 
1969) (university must develop "misconduct" standards for expelling students); Holmes v. New 
York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, (2d Cir. 1968) (agency must develop standards for grant 
and denial of public housing); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (agency must 
develop standards for eligibility for public assistance); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th 
Cir. 1964) (city must develop standards for the grant and denial of liquor licenses). 
115. See id. 
116. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7:26 at 128 (2d ed. 1979). 
117. /d. 
118. /d. at 131. 
119. 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968). 
120. /d. at 263. 
161] AGENCY LAWMAKING BY RULE 197 
dards of any kind to guide the exercise of its discretion. The court held 
that "due process requires [in these circumstances] that selections 
among applicants be made m accordance with 'ascertainable 
standards.' " 121 
However, the Holmes case does not necessarily require, as a mat-
ter of due process, agency creation of these standards by rule rather 
than by a reliance upon a system of precedents created in individual 
cases. While it may be possible to infer a rulemaking requirement from 
the opinion of the court, that inference is not mandatory. The same is 
true of a number of other lower federal court cases that rely upon the 
requirements of due process in order to force agencies to create stan-
dards to govern the exercise of their discretionary powers. While these 
cases may require the agencies involved to create such standards to en-
sure that the agencies do not exercise their discretionary powers in a 
wholly unstructured and arbitrary manner, they do not appear to re-
quire those standards to be created by rule rather than by a system of 
precedents created in individual cases. 122 And it should be noted that 
the reliance of agencies upon a system of precedents, as well as on 
rules, establishing standards governing their discretion, can go a long 
way towards securing the due process objective of these cases-the 
elimination of entirely random, unpredictable, unprincipled, and capri-
cious, low visibility agency decisionmaking in particular cases. 
On the other hand, some lower federal court cases may more 
clearly suggest that a due process, administrative standards requirement 
can only be satisfied by the issuance of rules. For example, White v. 
Roughton123 involved the validity of an administrator's action in deny-
ing or terminating financial assistance to individuals claiming benefits 
under an established program of the public body involved. No written 
standards governed the eligibility for such aid or the amounts that 
would be made available in particular cases. Instead, the administrator 
and his staff determined eligibility and the amount of benefits on the 
basis of "their own unwritten personal standards."124 In these circum-
stances, the court held that the lack of written standards vested "virtu-
ally unfettered discretion" in the administrator and his staff and, there-
fore "is clearly violative of due process."1211 It insisted that "[f]air and 
121. Jd. at 265. 
122. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964); Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
123. 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976). 
124. Jd. at 754. 
125. Jd. 
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consistent application of such [eligibility] requirements requires that 
[the administrator] establish written standards and regulations."126 
Another case that is worth mentioning in this connection is Soglin 
v. Kauffman. 127 The issue in that case was whether a public university 
could suspend particular students for non-academic "misconduct" with-
out having previously elaborated the specific content of that term by 
rule. The court held that the university could not do so because the 
term "misconduct," unaided by "rules" that would have increased its 
particularity, was void for vagueness as a matter of due process. 128 Sog-
lin is clear that "such sanctions [as suspension or expulsion must] be 
administered in accord with preexisting rules."129 However, the case 
does not stand for the more general proposition that agencies must 
structure their discretion by rule rather than by a system of individual 
case precedents in all circumstances where due process may require 
them to create operating standards in order to avoid arbitrary action. 
The reason for this conclusion is that the court in Soglin unambigu-
ously treated the university disciplinary proceeding as a penal proceed-
ing, noting specifically that "[t]he use of 'misconduct' [alone] as a stan-
dard in imposing the penalties threatened here" violates the 
requirements of due process of law.130 By analogizing the university 
disciplinary proceeding in question to the criminal process and the due 
process, void-for-vagueness requirements applicable to the criminal 
process, the court limited the applicability of the Soglin case to other 
situations in which the administrative process is being used for clearly 
penal rather than regulatory purposes. 
The United States Supreme Court has not confirmed the general 
thesis that due process may require agencies operating outside of the 
penal process to structure their discretion by rule rather than by a sys-
tem of individual case precedents so as to assure fair notice to persons 
who may be affected and to avoid wholly arbitrary administrative ac-
tion. Indeed, the discussion in Part II of this Article of the principal 
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the discretion of agen-
cies to choose the modality by which they make law, appears to demon-
strate that such a general thesis is unlikely to be received warmly in 
that quarter. As noted, there are also few (if any) lower federal court 
decisions that would unambiguously support this thesis, although a sig-
nificant number of lower federal court cases seem to agree that, in par-
126. Jd. 
127. 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
128. Jd. at 168. 
129. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
130. Jd. (emphasis supplied). 
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ticular circumstances, the risk of arbitrary agency decisionmaking with-
out further elaboration of the standards or criteria used by an agency to 
exercise its discretion may be so high as to be unfair in a due process 
sense. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that due process doctrine will gener-
ally require agencies operating outside of any penal process to elaborate 
their law primarily by rule rather than by order. Due process, there-
fore, does not appear to be a promising substitute for a legislative solu-
tion to the problem addressed by this Article. At best, due process may 
require agencies to elaborate their law by rule rather than by order in 
some rare instances where the agency process is of a nonpenal charac-
ter. The inertia of existing law on this subject and the strong presump-
tion of the validity of agency action131 are likely to minimize the num-
ber of situations in which agencies are required by due process to make 
their law primarily by rule. Those situations are also likely to be very 
unpredictable as well as infrequent. 
The reason for that unpredictability is the methodology currently 
used by the courts to determine whether particular procedures em-
ployed by an agency are so unfair as to violate due process. The appli-
cable methodology requires a court to engage in a balancing process in 
which it considers three factors: 
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 132 
One conclusion seems inevitable with respect to the application of these 
amorphous factors to a particular situation in order to determine 
whether the agency involved must elaborate its law in that context pri-
marily by rule. In practice, the application of these factors is likely to 
yield results that are very hard to predict beyond the justified assump-
131. See, e.g., United States v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Transcentury 
Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 843-44, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492 (1974); Colorado 
Health Facilities Review Council v. District Court, 689 P.2d 617, 623 (Col. 1984) (en bane); 
Mathiasen v. State Conservation Comm'n, 246 Iowa 905, 910, 70 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1955); New 
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 272, 279 (Me. 1982); Taub v. Pirnie, 
3 N.Y.2d 188, 195, 144 N.E.2d 3,6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, (1957). See also 2 F. CooPER, STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 450, 451 (1965); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 11.04, 
at 56 n.34, § 11.06 (1958); C. KocH, jR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.28 (1985); 
29 AM. juR. 2d Evidence § 172 (1962). 
132. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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tion that the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of an affirmance of the 
agency's determination because of the existing general state of the law 
on this subject, and the strong presumption in favor of the validity of 
agency action. 133 So, while due process may be of some marginal utility 
in efforts to increase agency lawmaking by rule, it is not an effective 
tool with which to establish a clear mandatory general preference for 
administrative rulemaking. 
D. Abuse of Discretion 
The typical state administrative procedure act provides that a 
court may reverse agency adjudicative action if it is "arbitrary or capri-
cious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted 
exercise of discretion."134 In addition, reviewing courts are often ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to set aside agency action on that basis 
by particular agency enabling acts and by the inherent judicial powers 
vested in state courts by the state constitution or the common law. As a 
result, reviewing courts may be called upon to determine whether an 
agency's use of adjudication rather than rulemaking to announce new 
law was "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discre-
tion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." While the imple-
mentation of this judicial review standard may result in a court impos-
ing a preference for agency lawmaking by rule in some particular 
situations, those situations will be very rare and narrowly defined. 
There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, a strong presumption 
of validity normally attaches to agency action.13& Second, state courts 
have almost always upheld as reasonable exercises of agency authority 
the choices of agencies in particular circumstances to develop their law 
by ad hoc order rather than by rulemaking. Nevertheless, a number of 
state and federal courts operating under similar judicial review stan-
dards136 have suggested that there are situations in which agency law-
making by order rather than by rule would be an abuse of discretion. 
For example, several state courts have indicated that while agen-
cies have broad discretion in choosing the lawmaking modality to be 
used in particular situations, the courts will review an agency's choice 
in order to ensure that the agency did not abuse its discretion or act 
133. See sources cited supra note 131. 
134. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19 § 15(g)(6) at 430-31. The acts of most states are 
based on the 1961 MSAPA. 14 U.L.A. 357 (1980). 
135. See sources cited supra note 131. 
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1983), for the similar standard to be applied by federal 
courts when they review federal agency action: "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion." 
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arbitrarily or capriciously. 187 However, in the particular cases in which 
these state courts indicated their willingness to review, on an abuse of 
discretion standard, an agency's choice to elaborate its law on a case-
by-case basis in adjudication rather than by rulemaking, they almost 
always upheld the action of the agency, and did so on a perfunctory 
basis. 188 Only one state case, other than those discussed earlier in this 
section under the statutory construction and due process categories, ac-
tually holds an agency's choice to engage in lawmaking by ad hoc order 
rather than by rulemaking to be an abuse of discretion on the particu-
lar facts before the court. That case is not helpful because the precise 
basis for the court's conclusion that the state agency abused its discre-
tion in deciding to proceed by adjudication is unclear. 139 
137. Potts v. Bennett, 487 So. 2d 919, 921-22 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (agency's choice to 
proceed by adjudication was not arbitrary or unjust); Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of the 
Dep't of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 387 Mass. 372, 379-80, 439 N.E.2d 792, 799 (1982) (agency's 
choice to proceed by adjudication was not an abuse of discretion); Bunge Corp. v. Commission of 
Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779,785 (Minn. 1981) (agency's choice to proceed by adjudication was not 
arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion); 613 Corp. v. Division of State Lottery, 210 N.J. 
Super. 485, 493, 510 A.2d 103, 111 (1986) (agency's choice to proceed by adjudication was an 
abuse of discretion). 
138. See cases cited supra note 137. 
139. 613 Corp. v. Division of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. at 485,510 A.2d at 103 (1986). 
It held that the agency abused its discretion when it denied a lottery ticket vendor's license to a 
particular applicant on the basis of the controversial nature of the applicant's principal business, 
because the agency had not previously issued a rule embodying such a policy. Id. at 500, 510 A.2d 
at 111. The precise basis for the court's conclusion that the agency abused its discretion by pro-
ceeding on the basis of adjudication rather than by rulemaking to establish this policy is unclear. 
It is possible that the court in this case decided only that the agency had established a de facto 
rule in the form of a policy of "general applicability" and "continuing effect," id. at 498, 510 
A.2d at 110, denying licenses on that ground, ("It appears likely that a policy of denying licenses 
to what the Lottery deems 'controversial enterprises' has been established," id. at 497, 510 A.2d at 
109), and, therefore, that the failure of the agency to make such a de facto policy de jure by 
issuing a formal rule after following required rulemaking procedures was improper, ("If an 
agency determination constitutes an 'administrative rule,' it must comply with the procedural re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to be valid," id. at 498, 510 A.2d at 110). If so, 
this case is similar to a number of other New Jersey cases invalidating an agency's action in an 
adjudication because the agency had issued a policy of general applicability and continuing ef-
fect-a de facto rule-that it had not made de jure by following required rulemaking procedures. 
See cases cited supra note 49. 
It is also possible, however, that this intermediate appellate court concluded, on the basis of a 
misreading of an earlier state supreme court decision, (see Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 
N.J. 138, 183 A.2d 64 (1962), discussed supra note 49), that an agency "delegated full rulemak-
ing power. . must bottom an alleged violation on general legislation [an agency rule] before it 
can. . [decide a particular case]," 210 N .]. Super. at 498, 510 A.2d at 110, and that an agency 
in such circumstances may not proceed wholly on the basis of adjudication unless it demonstrates 
that it must do so in order "to respond to specialized or unforseen problems," id. at 499, 510 A.2d 
at 110, which were not present in the instant case, id. at 499-500, 510 A.2d at 110-11. Or, the 
holding of this case may have been based on a misreading by this intermediate appellate court of 
another earlier state supreme court decision, (see Texter v. Department of Human Serv., 88 N.J. 
376, 443 A.2d 178 (1982), discussed supra note 49), for the proposition that "where the subject 
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Some federal cases have more clearly suggested particular circum-
stances in which federal agencies would abuse their discretion if they 
proceeded to elaborate their law by ad hoc order rather than by rule. 
After noting that agencies normally have broad discretion to choose the 
means of lawmaking modality employed in particular contexts, the 
United States Supreme Court indicated in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
Co. 140 that an agency might have to proceed by rule rather than by 
order in three situations: if "the adverse consequences" of retroactive 
lawmaking are so substantial because of past reliance on prior agency 
decisions "that the ... [agency] should be precluded from reconsidering 
the issue in an adjudicative proceeding;" if "some new liability is 
sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions that were taken in 
good-faith reliance on ... [agency] pronouncements;" or if the imposi-
tion of fines or damages was involved. 141 There is no other clear indica-
tion from the United States Supreme Court of circumstances in which 
agencies engaged in lawmaking without penal consequences would 
abuse their discretion if they chose adjudication rather than rulemaking 
for this purpose. There are, however, a number of lower federal court 
cases that have spoken on the subject. 
The most important of these cases is Ford Motor Company v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 142 a decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals. In Ford Motor Co. the Federal Trade Commission had chal-
lenged, in a particular agency adjudication, the lawfulness of certain 
practices of an automobile dealer in repossessing cars from defaulting 
purchasers. 143 That adjudication was the first agency action against a 
dealer for such conduct; and it was clear that industry practice had 
been to do what the dealer involved in this case had done. 144 The court 
held that the decision of the agency to proceed by adjudication rather 
than by rulemaking was an abuse of discretion because "the rule of the 
case made below will have general application. It will not apply just to 
Francis Ford. Credit practices similar to those of Francis Ford are wide 
spread in the car dealership industry."145 In short, even though the 
matter of a quasi-judicial adjudication encompasses concerns that transcend those of individual 
litigants ... rulemaking procedures should be followed." /d. at 498-99, 510 A.2d at 110. In any 
case, to the extent the latter basis for finding an abuse of discretion in agency lawmaking by 
adjudication differs from the first basis, it will be discussed in the context of more explicit federal 
case law on the subject. See infra text accompanying notes 142-53. 
140. 416 u.s. 267 (1974). 
141. Id. at 295. 
142. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982). See generally Berg, 
supra note 18. 
143. 673 F.2d at 1008-09. 
144. Id. at 1009-10. 
145. /d. at 1110. 
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Federal Trade Commission had issued an order through appropriate 
adjudicatory procedures that was directed solely at the parties involved 
in the particular case, the court held the agency had abused its discre-
tion because it should have proceeded by rulemaking rather than by 
adjudication to establish the new law in question. 
Ford Motor Co. appears to hold "that an agency action which 
changes existing law and has widespread application [in its ultimate 
effect] must be accomplished through rulemaking and not by adjudica-
tion,"148 and that if an agency seeks to engage in lawmaking with that 
effect by means of adjudication, the agency abuses its discretion. Ford 
Motor Co. relied on an earlier United States Court of Appeals case, 
Patel v. I.N.S., 147 for the proposition that "agencies can proceed by 
adjudication to enforce discrete violations of existing laws where the 
effective scope of the rules impact will be relatively small; but an 
agency must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the law and 
establish rules of widespread application .... " 148 
There are a number of difficulties with the conclusion that an 
agency abuses its discretion whenever the agency uses adjudication 
rather than rulemaking to engage in lawmaking in these circumstances. 
First, as Davis notes, the principal proposition asserted in the Ford 
Motor Co. case 
that "an agency must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the 
law and establish rules of widespread application" ... is truly spec-
tacular because (a) no previous law supports it, (b) both courts and 
agencies have at all stages in their development changed law through 
adjudication even when such law is of widespread application, and (c) 
the proposition is directly contrary to two prominent Supreme Court 
holdings, ... S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp, and ... NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. 149 
Second, no special circumstances appear in the Ford Motor Co. case 
that would justify the action of the court in setting aside as an abuse of 
discretion that particular decision of the agency to engage in ad hoc 
lawmaking by order rather than by rule. 15° Consequently, Davis ap-
pears to be correct when he states that federal law does not support the 
abuse of discretion principle concerning an agency's choice of lawmak-
146. See Berg, supra note 18, at 155. See also K. DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:25 (2d ed. 1979, Supp. 1982) [hereinafter DAVIS, 1982 SUPP.]. 
147. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980). The case is criticized in DAVIS, 1982 SUPP., supra note 
146 at 180. 
148. 673 F.2d at 1009. 
149. See DAVIS, 1982 SuPP., supra note 146 at 181-82. 
150. See Berg, supra note 18, at 158-60. 
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ing modality that was enunciated by the Ford Motor Co. case, and that 
federal law should not do so. un 
It is hard to justify the Ford Motor Co. principle as a defensible 
application of the "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse 
of discretion" standard of judicial review. After all, the courts have re-
peatedly held that agencies have broad discretion to choose the method 
by which they elaborate their law in circumstances where they have 
been delegated authority to do so either by rule or by order; and a 
strong presumption of validity attaches to agency action. The fact that 
agency rulemaking is a more desirable means of changing existing law 
in circumstances in which that change will affect many people does not 
suggest, absent special circumstances, that an agency vested with broad 
discretion to choose either means of lawmaking can be demonstrated to 
have abused its discretion, or to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously, if 
it instead issues an otherwise de jure adjudicatory order with that ef-
fect. Cases in at least one state express a similar view. The Florida 
Supreme Court has indicated that while "[a]dministrative agencies are 
not required to institute rulemaking procedures each time a new policy 
is developed, ... that form of proceeding is preferable where estab-
lished industry-wide policy is being altered."1112 The American Bar As-
sociation has also suggested the desirability of such agency action in 
these circumstances recognizing, however, that the existing state of the 
law cannot reasonably be construed to require that result in the absence 
of special circumstances. 1113 
151. See DAVIS, 1982 SuPP., supra note 146 at 183. 
152. Florida Cities Water v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980) 
(emphasis added). See also Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel & Tel., 435 So. 2d 892, 
895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
153. The Council of the American Bar Association formulated the following resolution which 
was subsequently adopted by the ABA House of Delegates: 
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association approves the following principles 
respecting the choice between rulemaking and adjudication in administrative agency 
proceeding: 
1. An agency is generally free to announce new policy through an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
2. When rulemaking is feasible and practicable, an agency which has been granted 
broad rulemaking authority ordinarily should use rulemaking rather than adjudi-
cation for large-scale changes, such as proscribing established industry-wide prac-
tices not previously thought to be unlawful. 
3. An agency should not be empowered to treat its adjudicatory decisions precisely as 
if they were rules. In particular, it is inappropriate to empower an agency or court 
to treat third-party departures from holdings in agency adjudications as, ipso facto, 
violations of law. Where the precedent of a prior adjudication is sought to be 
applied in a subsequent adjudication, a party should have a meaningful opportu-
nity to persuade the agency that the principle involved should be modified or held 
inapplicable to his situation. 
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In sum, then, the "abuse of discretion" standard cannot be read to 
require agencies to use rulemaking rather than adjudication whenever 
they change the existing state of the law in a way that will have an 
impact of widespread application through the doctrine of stare decisis. 
This conclusion is justified in light of the strong presumption of validity 
of agency action, the broad discretion vested in most agencies to choose 
their lawmaking modality in particular circumstances, and the over-
whelming number of cases upholding the propriety of agency choices on 
that subject. And even if the "abuse of discretion" standard could be 
read in this way by state courts, application of that standard would not 
solve the problem to which this paper is addressed because it would not 
require agencies delegated authority to engage in lawmaking by order 
as well as by rule to prefer rulemaking for all such lawmaking as soon 
as feasible and to the extent practicable. Instead, application of this 
standard would only require agencies to use rulemaking rather than 
adjudication for some narrower subset of situations. Therefore, it is not 
an adequate substitute for the imposition of a much more general obli-
gation on state agencies to prefer lawmaking by rule. 
E. Conclusion: Power of Courts to Require Rulemaking 
Prior discussion demonstrates that under various theories and to 
various extents, courts may require agencies authorized to engage in 
lawmaking by rules as well as by orders to exercise that function by 
rulemaking rather than by adjudication in particular circumstances. 
While some of the theories discussed are sounder than others, and some 
hold greater promise for acceptance by the courts than others, they are 
not sufficient, either individually or collectively, to enforce the kind of 
general preference for agency lawmaking by rule proposed in part III 
of this Article. That is, while these theories are individually and collec-
tively helpful in moving agencies in the direction proposed by part III 
of this Article, they will not ensure that, generally, state agencies au-
thorized to make law by rule as well as by order, will do so by 
rulemaking as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable. The only 
fully satisfactory means with which to ensure such a general preference 
for administrative lawmaking by rule, therefore, is legislative. 
Note that the "first paragraph is an expression of disapproval with the broad principle 
announced in Ford Motor Co." and the third paragraph attempts to ensure that an 
agency is "held to the procedural consequences of its choice" between the two modali-
ties of lawmaking. See Berg, supra note 18, at 177. 
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V. A LEGISLATIVE SoLUTION 
Prior discussion demonstrates that a mandatory preference for 
state agency lawmaking by rule that is fully satisfactory may be estab-
lished only by legislation. Section 2-1 04(3) of the new Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (1981 MSAP A)1M seeks to accomplish this 
result. It provides that each agency must, "as soon as feasible and to the 
extent practicable, adopt rules . . . embodying appropriate standards, 
principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the 
law it administers." 11111 This broad and general provision attempts to 
compel agencies to act as speedily as possible and to go as far as they 
reasonably can to structure by rule the procedural and substantive dis-
cretion conferred upon them, so as to minimize arbitrary action and 
give fair notice to the public. That is, to the extent possible and prudent 
under the circumstances, this provision requires agencies initially to 
elaborate the major contours of their procedural and substantive discre-
tion by rule rather than by ad hoc adjudicatory order. 1116 
The specific language of this 1981 MSAPA provision requires 
agencies to issue both rules containing "appropriate . . . procedural 
safeguards" and rules containing substantive "standards [and] princi-
ples ... that the agency will apply to the law it administers."1117 This 
154. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1981), 14 U.L.A. 73 (1987 Supp.) 
[hereinafter 1981 MSAPA]. As a Reporter for the 1981 MSAPA, the author of this Article was 
responsible for the drafting of § 2-104. 
155. /d. 
156. An Illinois statute may have a similar purpose. However, poor drafting may interfere 
with the accomplishment of that result. The statute provides: "Each rule which implements a 
discretionary power to be exercised by an agency shall include the standards by which the agency 
shall exercise the power. Such standards shall be stated as precisely and clearly as practicable 
under the conditions, to inform fully those persons affected." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, § 1004.02 
(1981 ). The difficulty with this statute is that it does not indicate clearly whether agencies are 
required, in the first place, to adopt rules to implement their discretionary powers. On its face, 
this provision appears applicable only to situations in which agencies have already decided to issue 
rules to implement their discretionary powers. It does not appear to require them initially to use 
rules rather than ad hoc orders to implement those powers. But this could be a misreading of the 
language or intention of this provision. If so, the Illinois statute is the first state law seeking to 
impose a mandatory preference for state agency lawmaking by rule. See Escalona v. Board of 
Trustees, State Employees Retirement Sys., 127 Ill. App. 3d 357, 469 N.E.2d 297 (1984). As 
subsequent discussion in the text will indicate, the MSAPA provision is superior to the Illinois 
statute because the former does not contain the same defects as the latter. 
A recently enacted Utah statute also may have a similar purpose. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-
3(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1987) provides that "[i]n addition to other rulemaking required by law, each 
agency shall make rules when agency action (a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action. 
[or] (b) provides or prohibits a material benefit." As subsequent discussion in the text will indi-
cate, the MSAPA provision is superior to this Utah provision in so far as the MSAPA provision 
specifically provides that such rulemaking is required only "as soon as feasible and to the extent 
practicable." 
157. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 154, at 73. 
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means that agencies must make a substantial effort to provide, by rule, 
procedural protections that are adequate, under the particular circum-
stances, to protect persons affected by agency action against improper 
exercises of agency power. It also requires agencies to make a substan-
tial effort to elaborate, by rule, the substantive standards used in the 
application of the laws they administer in order to provide fair notice of 
their contents and some assurance that they will be consistently applied. 
This model statutory provision is qualified by an express rule of 
reason. It only requires agencies to engage in such rulemaking "as soon 
as feasible and to the extent practicable." So an agency need only adopt 
rules of the enumerated type as quickly as it reasonably can under the 
particular circumstances in which it operates. Furthermore, an agency 
need only adopt such rules as far as-to the degree-reasonably possi-
ble under the particular circumstances in which it operates. This rule 
of reason embodying the standards of "feasible" and "practicable" is 
more demanding of agencies than the general and unstructured duty to 
act in a reasonable manner that is imposed upon them by the typical 
state judicial review provision, and less demanding of them than would 
be the imposition of an unqualified obligation to issue rules of this 
kind. 
Many factors must be considered when applying the agency obli-
gation to make the required rules "as soon as feasible and to the extent 
practicable." Agencies and courts must consider the individual circum-
stances of the relevant agency, and the particular circumstances of the 
subject matter to which the mandatory rulemaking requirements are to 
be applied. And, of course, the factors relating to the timeliness of an 
agency's performance of its obligation will be closely related to and in-
tertwined with the factors relating to the detail and precision with 
which it must perform that obligation. 
The rulemaking obligations imposed by this provision must be 
performed in a timely fashion. Agencies must make the required rules 
"as soon as feasible." The word "feasible" means "capable of being 
done, executed, or effected: possible of realization."168 It also means 
"capable of being utilized ... , or dealt with successfully: suitable."169 
Its synonym is "possible."160 In determining when an agency, with re-
spect to a particular matter, must make the rules required by the 1981 
MSAPA provision, the following factors should be considered: the ex-
tent to which the agency had an opportunity to accumulate the neces-
158. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
831 (1976). 
159. /d. 
160. /d. See also American Textile Mfrs. lnst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981 ). 
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sary knowledge and experience to resolve the matter by rule in a sound 
manner; the extent to which the performance of this rulemaking obliga-
tion would have precluded the agency from performing other more im-
portant legal obligations; the extent to which related matters or circum-
stances were not sufficiently settled so as to permit satisfactory 
resolution by rule of the issues involved; and the extent to which 
greater precision or detail in the agency law was possible in light of the 
factors relevant to the sufficiency of its precision and detail, which will 
be discussed next. It should be stressed, however, that in considering 
these relevant factors, agencies and courts must respect the fact that 
rulemaking of the kind required by this model statutory provision must 
be executed only "as soon as feasible," which means, as soon as it is 
capable of being done under the circumstances. 
Agencies are also required by this provision of the MSAPA to 
elaborate their law by rule only "to the extent practicable." The word 
"practicable" means "possible to practice or perform: capable of being 
put into practice, done, or accomplished: feasible. " 161 It also means "ca-
pable of being used: usable."162 Its synonym is also "possible."163 The 
precision and detail with which an agency must make the rules relat-
ing to a particular matter should be determined in light of the following 
factors: the resources available to the agency for the more detailed and 
precise elaboration of its law; the extent to which the formulation and 
adoption of more detailed and precise rules would have precluded the 
agency from performing other more important legal obligations; the ex-
tent to which further detail or precision would impede the achievement 
of lawful agency objectives; the extent to which changing circumstances 
or existing uncertainties make further elaboration of agency law incon-
sistent with lawful policies the agency wishes to achieve; the extent to 
which the particular questions to be addressed involve so many complex 
facts and policy considerations, and are of such a narrow scope, that 
their more detailed or specific resolution is unmanageable outside of an 
adjudication settling the rights of particular persons on the basis of 
their circumstances; the extent to which the agency has been unable to 
accumulate sufficient expertise to elaborate its law any further; the ex-
tent to which additional detail or precision is necessary to afford af-
fected parties with fair notice and the forseeability of the need for addi-
tional detail or precision for this purpose; and the extent to which the 
agency had the time, consistent with the timeliness factors noted above, 
161. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1780 (1976). 
162. /d. 
163. /d. 
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to further elaborate its law. It should also be stressed that, in consider-
ing these factors, agencies and courts must respect the fact that 
rulemaking is required only "to the extent practicable," which means 
with as much precision and detail as is capable of being accomplished 
under the circumstances. 
Prior discussion demonstrates that Section 2-104(3) of the 1981 
MSAPA uses the terms "feasible" and "practicable" to mean that 
agencies must initially make their law by rule rather than by order as 
soon as reasonably possible and as far as reasonably possible in light of 
the particular circumstances of the agency and subject matter involved. 
This model statutory provision embodies a clear legislative determina-
tion that the values of prompt elaboration of agency law by rule and 
detailed elaboration of agency law by rule are to be preferred over the 
competing general values of agency convenience or agency preference 
for ad hoc law making in the course of adjudications. As a result, the 
1981 MSAPA provision would fundamentally change existing law in 
most states by denying agencies authorized to issue rules and to decide 
individual cases plenary discretion to consider, on an entirely equal 
footing, lawmaking by rule and lawmaking by order, as alternative 
means with which to elaborate their law. Instead, this provision embod-
ies a general direction to agencies mandating a clear preference in favor 
of lawmaking by rule, subject to a rule of reason. 
Effective enforcement of this statutory preference for initial agency 
lawmaking by rule would not appear to be difficult. A reviewing court 
could invalidate the application of agency law created ad hoc in the 
course of an adjudication whenever the agency was required to make 
that law initially in the form of a rule. That is what happened in the 
Oregon Megdal case. 164 Such an invalidation of improper retrospective 
agency lawmaking by ad hoc adjudicatory order would be an effective 
means by which to induce agencies to comply with the requirements of 
this model statutory provision. An agency failing in some manner to 
perform its obligation, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practica-
ble," to make its law by rule, could not cure its failure retrospectively; 
but the agency could do so prospectively by issuing the appropriate 
rules it should have issued previously. Those rules would then be appli-
cable, from the time of their effective date, to all those within their 
ambit except, perhaps, to the extent particular individuals could 
demonstrate that the earlier agency failure to make the rules in ques-
tion unduly prejudiced them at that later time. 
Criticisms of the language of the 1981 MSAPA provision on the 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69. 
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ground that it is vague do not stand on solid ground. One cannot deny 
that the words "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable" are 
vague. But the same may be said about many general requirements 
imposed on administrative bodies. Administrative procedure acts, for 
example, usually authorize courts to overturn agency action that is "ar-
bitrary," "capricious," or "an abuse of discretion."165 The effect of such 
a delegation of authority to the courts is to impose on agencies an obli-
gation to act in a manner which is certainly vague at the margin. The 
desirability of such admittedly vague obligations, however, may best be 
assessed by calculating the total benefits they actually achieve in prac-
tice and comparing those benefits to the total costs associated with their 
everyday implementation - including the costs attributable to the fact 
that in some situations agencies will not be clear about the effect of 
those requirements on their actions. After engaging in such a compari-
son, the drafters of the 1981 MSAPA concluded that the total benefits 
obtained from agency efforts to comply with that act's mandatory pref-
erence for agency lawmaking by rule would substantially exceed the 
total costs of those efforts. That judgment seems sound. 
While this model statutory provision expresses a generalized legis-
lative preference for rulemaking rather than adjudication as the pri-
mary method of agency lawmaking, it also indicates, as noted earlier, 
that this preference is not absolute. Case-by-case administrative law-
making is sanctioned by this provision in circumstances where rulemak-
ing is not yet "feasible" and in relation to matters as to which rulemak-
ing is not "practicable." No agency is omniscient enough to eliminate 
every ambiguity in its rules, or to anticipate every question that will 
arise in the administration of its programs. There will always be cir-
cumstances in which the elaboration of particular details of agency law 
by rules will be impracticable, or the issuance, at a particular point in 
time, of rules to embody particular agency law, will be infeasible. 
Consequently, agencies must continue to make some of their law 
on a case-by-case basis in adjudicatory proceedings. However, it is de-
sirable, for the many reasons noted earlier, to ensure that as much 
agency law is incorporated in rules as is possible. Therefore, a means 
must be found to ensure that agencies incorporate in rules issued at a 
later time those principles of law they created initially in the course of 
their adjudications. Section 2-104(4) of the 1981 MSAPA seeks to en-
sure this result. That provision states that "as soon as feasible and to 
the extent practicable, [each agency must] adopt rules to supersede 
principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the agency as the basis 
165. See, e.g., 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 15(g)(6). 
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for its decisions in particular cases.mee The practical effect of this pro-
posed statute would be to require agencies engaged in initial lawmak-
ing by ad hoc order under the rule of reason exception contained in 
Section 2-104(3), to make a serious subsequent effort to displace that 
case law with rules. The reasons for requiring agencies to supersede 
with rules, law properly made in the course of their adjudications, in-
clude almost all of the reasons advanced earlier in support of a require-
ment that agencies initially make their law by rule rather than by ad 
hoc adjudicatory order. 
It should be stressed that this post hoc rulemaking provision only 
requires agencies, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," 
to displace with rules, principles of law properly developed in their case 
precedent. This rule of reason is identical to the rule of reason con-
tained in Section 2-104(3) of the 1981 MSAPA. Consequently, the dis-
cussion of the rule of reason applicable to that provision establishing a 
preference for initial agency lawmaking by rule is also fully applicable 
to this provision requiring only post hoc rulemaking. 
The rules an agency makes to satisfy its post hoc rulemaking obli-
gation need not be wholly congruent with the displaced principles of 
law declared by the agency in particular cases. So long as they are both 
substantively and procedurally within the authority delegated to the 
166. Note that this provision of the 1981 MSAPA was bracketed because the NCCUSL 
believed that it would be very controversial. Note also that Wisconsin has a provision in its Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act stating that "[e]ach agency authorized by law to exercise discretion in 
deciding individual cases may formalize the general policies evolving from its decisions by promul-
gating the policies as rules which the agency shall follow until they are amended or repealed." 
Wis. Stat. § 227.11 (2)(c) (1987 Supp.). However, this provision appears to be superfluous because 
agencies are virtually always deemed to have implied authority to codify in rules principles of law 
that they have lawfully adopted in particular cases. And it does not go as far as the MSAPA 
provision because the latter requires agencies to displace by rules, principles of law properly 
adopted in individual cases, while the former only authorizes them to do so. 
On the other hand, in an apparent effort to emulate the objectives of the MSAPA provision 
quoted in the text, Utah recently enacted a statute providing as follows: "Each agency shall enact 
rules incorporating the principles of law established by final adjudicative decisions within 90 days 
after the decision is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(6) (Supp. 1987). This provision 
differs from the similar 1981 MSAPA provision in three principal respects. First, the Utah provi-
sion imposes an absolute 90 day time limit for post hoc rulemaking in place of the "as soon as 
feasible" standard contained in the MSAPA provision. Second, the Utah provision imposes an 
absolute requirement for the incorporation in rules of all principles of law established in adjudica-
tion while the MSAPA provision requires such post hoc rulemaking only "to the extent practica-
ble." Finally, the Utah provision requires the agency to codify in rules principles of law contained 
in final adjudicative decisions, while the MSAPA provision only requires the agency to adopt rules 
to "supersede" those principles. The MSAPA provision is clearly superior to the Utah provision. 
This is so because, as subsequent discussion in the text will demonstrate, each of the three vari-
ances from the MSAPA provision, noted above, is a defect. The three variances from the MSAPA 
provision contained in the Utah provision are undesirable because they unduly limit agency discre-
tion and do not take account of the practical realities of day-to-day agency operation. 
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agency, the rules required by this provision may codify, be broader or 
narrower than, or prospectively overrule, the case law they displace. 
The validity of such a rule, therefore, will not depend upon whether 
the rule is an accurate codification in all respects of the agency case law 
it replaces. As long as the agency acts in a manner consistent with its 
authorizing legislation and with required rulemaking procedures, the 
agency may simply adopt that earlier case law as a rule without sub-
stantive alteration, adopt it with minor or substantial alterations, or 
repudiate for the future all or a portion of that law. The 1981 MSAPA 
provision only requires that, "as soon as feasible and to the extent prac-
ticable," an agency must engage in a rulemaking proceeding to consider 
and adopt a rule governing those subjects as to which it has developed 
discernible law in adjudications. 
An agency that breaches its duty to displace a line of case prece-
dent with a rule may not subsequently rely on that line of precedent. 
Instead, the agency must readjudicate wholly de novo whatever princi-
ples of law might apply to the particular circumstances covered by that 
earlier case law. Of course, this remedy may not be particularly effec-
tive in practice. In subsequent adjudication, the agency might adopt and 
apply the same principle of law embedded in the prior precedent upon 
which the agency could no longer lawfully rely, without actually recon-
sidering the underlying issues on their merits. Courts enforcing such a 
post hoc rulemaking requirement will have to be vigilant to ensure that 
agencies fully and fairly reconsider the propriety and desirability of 
prior agency case law in such circumstances rather than only appear to 
do so. That will not be an easy task and it will be laden with difficul-
ties. Admittedly, the absence of a fully effective mechanism with which 
to ensure agency compliance with this post hoc rulemaking requirement 
is a problem. However, even if this provision is not, in every instance, 
effectively enforceable in the courts, it is desirable in order to communi-
cate community expectations to the agencies and to facilitate the evalua-
tion of agency performance by the legislature and the public at large. 
This post hoc rulemaking requirement may also be criticized as 
being excessively vague. "How generally applicable must an adjudica-
tory determination be in order to constitute a 'principle of law or pol-
icy' " that must be displaced by a rule ?167 Where, between the ex-
tremes of an adjudicatory decision deciding the law applicable to a 
particular case in only the very narrowest, fact specific terms, and an 
adjudicatory decision announcing its decision on the basis of a legal 
principle with potentially broad stare decisis consequences, does a prin-
167. Scalia, supra note 43, at 25, 28. 
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ciple of law emerge that must be displaced by a rule pursuant to the 
requirements of this statutory provision? There is an answer to this 
question. 
The displacement of agency case law by rules is required by this 
provision only "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable." Prac-
ticability will require that a particular agency elaboration of law in an 
adjudication extend beyond the facts of the specific case in which that 
law originates before it must be embodied in a rule. This means that a 
principle of law declared in an agency adjudication must, in practical 
effect, be of potential general applicability before its displacement by a 
rule is required. The extent to which a principle of law declared as the 
basis for a particular adjudication is of potential general applicability 
may be ascertained from the text of the agency decision, and the nature 
of the particular facts and determinations involved in that case. 
On the one hand, it is clear that an agency with an identifiable 
line of decisions based upon a particular principle of law must displace 
that principle with a rule "as soon as feasible and to the extent practi-
cable." On the other hand, it is clear that an agency need not engage in 
any rulemaking if it only issues a single decision on a subject, and that 
decision appears to rest only on the peculiar or unusual circumstances 
of that particular case rather than on some discernible principle of 
more general applicability. Of course, even where there is only a single 
decision on a subject, that decision may be decided in such a way as to 
make clear that it rests on a principle broader than its unique circum-
stances, thus making the requirements of this post hoc rulemaking re-
quirement fully applicable. So, this provision will require some judg-
ments by agencies. And a reviewing court will uphold those judgments 
unless they constitute a clear abuse of discretion. To demonstrate such 
a clear abuse of discretion and overcome the presumption of agency 
regularity, a party will either have to demonstrate a pattern of agency 
decisions on a particular subject clearly establishing an agency default 
in its duties under this provision, or show that a single agency decision 
on a particular subject is written, or has been treated by the agency, in 
such a way as to indicate clearly its potential general applicability. 
In the end, one must admit that the requirement imposed by Sec-
tion 2-1 04( 4) of the 1981 MSAPA is vague at its periphery. But so are 
many other general requirements imposed on agencies; and this re-
quirement is no more vague than many other general requirements im-
posed on agencies for which there is broad support in our body politic. 
For example, as noted earlier, administrative procedure acts generally 
authorize courts to overturn agency action that is "arbitrary," "capri-
cious," or an "abuse of discretion." Yet the obligations imposed on 
agencies by this delegation of authority to the courts are vague at the 
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margin and, therefore, are not without cost on that basis. Nevertheless, 
there is a general agreement that these impositions on agencies are val-
uable tools with which to assure lawful and responsible agency action. 
The same may be said about the requirements embodied in the 1981 
MSAPA post hoc rulemaking provision. The total benefits flowing 
from conscientious efforts to apply that provision are likely to outweigh 
substantially the total costs incurred in the course of those efforts. 
This is so even though the "sheer magnitude of the task [hence 
cost] of such codification" of agency case law in rules may be great. 168 
Our society decided, long ago, that those subject to the law are entitled 
to fair notice of its contents, and that the public and its politically re-
sponsible officials should have an effective opportunity to monitor, and 
to participate in, its creation. To accomplish these important objectives 
we have been willing to assume all reasonable costs. There is no evi-
dence that the costs of formally displacing agency case law with rules in 
the manner contemplated by this provision would be especially large or 
disproportionate to the benefits gained from such action. Agencies al-
ready informally codify many of their adjudicatory decisions for inter-
nal staff use even if they do not follow the rulemaking process when 
they do so, or make the product generally available to the public at 
large. How else can agencies educate their own staffs about the law 
they are to apply, and assure that in practice their staffs follow all 
applicable agency law? To that extent, the additional costs imposed by 
the displacement of agency case law by rules, "as soon as feasible and 
to the extent practicable," are likely to be much smaller than opponents 
might otherwise suggest. 
The 1981 MSAPA post hoc rulemaking requirement has been 
criticized on the ground that it creates an unacceptable dilemma with 
respect to the fairness of agency lawmaking. "If the subsequent 
rulemaking [displacing agency case law] regularly endorses the holdings 
of earlier adjudications, they will rightly be regarded as charades.mss 
On the other hand, if "they often reverse (for the future) those holdings 
- which have been the basis for particularized commands or even pen-
alties in the past - then the adjudicatory process is bound to fall into 
deserved disrepute. " 170 
This criticism does not withstand analysis. It is true that in the 
rulemaking proceedings to displace agency law created in adjudications, 
agencies may, within the scope of their delegated authority, either cod-
ify that law in the rule finally adopted, reject it as being unsound, or 
168. /d. 
169. !d. 
170. /d. 
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modify It m some way. But surely this is not an unusual situation. 
From time-to-time, legislatures as well as agencies have codified, in 
ways that are simply declaratory of the preexisting law, common law 
principles as well as principles embedded in agency case law. So, too, 
legislatures by statute, as well as agencies by rule, have altered or abol-
ished principles embedded in the common law or in agency case law. It 
seems indefensible to argue that these positive law confirmations, modi-
fications, or repudiations of prior case law principles are unacceptable 
when they occur as part of an institutionalized process that requires 
agencies to reconsider the propriety of the law they create in the course 
of adjudications. When a legislature requires a reconsideration of 
agency case law, it expressly sanctions such agency action and the sub-
sequent displacement of that agency case law by agency rules. In addi-
tion, the process of agency reconsideration in a rulemaking proceeding 
of principles of law established in its own cases is more democratic, 
more politically responsible, and more visible, than the more closed ad-
judication processes that initially created that law. Had the legislature 
itself accomplished the identical reconsideration by statute, no one could 
reasonably complain that anything unseemly or harmful had occurred. 
It is hard to see how that conclusion is altered when the legislature, 
instead, orders an agency to engage in such a reconsideration subject to 
procedures that would make its action highly visible, responsive to the 
public and to politically accountable officials, and consistent with the 
need for fully informed decisionmaking. 
The post hoc rulemaking requirement contained in Section 2-
1 04( 4) of the 1 981 MSAP A embodies a fair compromise between the 
practical need of agencies to continue making some of their law by ad-
judication, and the practical need of the public and their politically ac-
countable surrogates to have agencies make as much of their law as is 
reasonably possible by rule. The provision is surely not perfect; there is 
merit in the vagueness charge and there will be some difficulty in en-
suring the provision's full enforcement. On balance, however, this post 
hoc rulemaking requirement is a substantial advance in the existing 
law on this subject, and a reasonable effort to reconcile some important 
competing values. 
A final but important point should be made about both the 1981 
MSAPA provision requiring agencies initially to make their law by 
rule rather than by order, and the 1981 MSAPA provision requiring 
agencies to engage in post hoc rulemaking to displace principles of law 
properly adopted by ad hoc adjudication. The burden of persuasion 
will be on those who wish to challenge, in a court, an agency decision 
to proceed initially by order rather than by rule to elaborate its law on 
a particular subject, or an agency failure to displace by rules specified 
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principles of law properly declared in its adjudications. Persons chal-
lenging such agency action will have to convince the reviewing court 
that rulemaking by the agency was feasible at the time in question and 
practicable with respect to the matter in question. A combination of the 
usual presumption of administrative regularity171 and the express prin-
ciple of reason that modifies the requirements of these two provisions, 
will ensure that agencies subject to these provisions will retain some 
latitude within which they may use adjudication for lawmaking. But 
they will no longer be able to treat rulemaking and adjudication as 
fungible means of lawmaking. Instead, they will have to rely upon 
rulemaking in all situations where they do not have a really strong 
justification for engaging in lawmaking by ad hoc order. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most states have uncritically followed federal law by allowing 
state agencies authorized to issue rules and to decide individual cases to 
elaborate their law either by rule or by order. The only limitations 
imposed by these states on their agencies' choice of lawmaking modality 
are a general duty to act reasonably, and a duty to follow any specific 
statutory commands applicable to particular situations. As a result, 
most states have vested their agencies with a very broad discretion in 
choosing the means by which they will exercise their delegated law-
making functions. This is unfortunate. Previous discussion demon-
strates that state agencies should generally be required, "as soon as fea-
sible and to the extent practicable," to make their law initially by rule 
rather than by ad hoc order. A number of important differences be-
tween the state and federal administrative processes were highlighted to 
demonstrate that such a broad-scoped rulemaking preference is more 
urgent for state administrative lawmaking than for federal administra-
tive lawmaking. 
A clear and binding general preference for initial state agency 
lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order is desirable because of 
the overwhelming advantages of the former in most situations. Almost 
all of the advantages of rulemaking suggest that it would also be desira-
ble to require post hoc rulemaking by agencies in situations where they 
must initially make law by order. So long as these requirements are 
subject to a principle of reason, they are likely to be consistent with the 
practical need to operate state agencies efficiently, effectively, and eco-
nomically. It seems clear that the many advantages of such a 
171. Recall the usual presumption of agency regularity. See sources cited supra note 131. 
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mandatory preference for state administrative rulemaking far outweigh 
its disadvantages. 
This Article has demonstrated that the courts in a few states have 
attempted to create a binding preference for administrative lawmaking 
by rule in the absence of explicit statutory authority. While these ef-
forts have been helpful, their impact has been relatively limited because 
only a handful of states are involved; the circumstances in which these 
courts have required rulemaking have been narrowly defined; and the 
legal justification for these judicially imposed requirements has some-
times been unclear or even dubious. Nevertheless, the Oregon courts 
have provided a potential basis for a relatively broad-scoped, judicially 
imposed preference for administrative lawmaking by rule. In the ab-
sence of a statutory solution, its efforts are worthy of emulation by 
other state courts because they appear to be both legitimate and consis-
tent with sound public policy. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that legislation is the best means by which 
to ensure a generally applicable, broad-scoped preference for state 
agency lawmaking by rule. In each state, a statute requiring agencies, 
"as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," to elaborate their 
law by rule rather than by ad hoc order, in the absence of specific 
legislation to the contrary, would be desirable. This statute should be 
supplemented by a statute requiring agencies, "as soon as feasible and 
to the extent practicable," to displace with rules principles of law prop-
erly adopted by them in particular cases. Together, these provisions 
would ensure that state agencies authorized to make rules and to decide 
individual cases would elaborate the major contours of their law by 
rule, and would resort to lawmaking by adjudication only when 
rulemaking was disfunctional or unrealistic in the particular circum-
stances. Agencies would no longer be able to choose freely to make their 
law wholly or primarily by ad hoc order. 
The benefits that would flow from increased state agency lawmak-
ing by rule and decreased state agency lawmaking by order are likely to 
be considerable. They are likely to include enhanced agency attentive-
ness to the wishes of the general public, greater agency accountability 
to the governor and legislature, increased visibility for the contents of 
agency law, decreased opportunities for arbitrary agency action, in-
creased agency efficiency, and better quality agency decisionmaking. 
There are undoubtedly costs in imposing such a mandatory general 
preference for rulemaking on state agencies; but the benefits that are 
likely to flow from such a requirement appear to exceed those costs by 
a substantial amount. 
